Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 49edeb0f0a29f66f…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 4873077329c11771b61c06a96606562c SHA-1: d253850d821b9fe8eb79e382b3fe95a021df5607 SHA-256: 49edeb0f0a29f66f5d1e9993a27295282c05c920a02c25bfb29485c7f01de9ce
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor vulnerabilities. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `RTF_OBJUPDATE` strongly suggests an exploit targeting the Equation Editor component to achieve arbitrary code execution. This is a common delivery mechanism for initial access.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000009e.bin
58a37b76bb6decbf2e018f6436682ecf77f793c14a3413de1dc7392b8fc1bf63
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x9E 1729 bytes