Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 49bf659b1788aed8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

83.6 KB Created: 2021-09-09 02:14:39 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-12
MD5: 43302427e0a7f6af7e5978d90e706d0f SHA-1: 2ac7b8030fb43efef8aa5c6cc988da5dbb3d75f5 SHA-256: 49bf659b1788aed8a4af82fb7f2f950f0a63e920052e5d45426d4998c0f9987e
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was flagged by ML classifiers and ClamAV as malicious, specifically as a phishing trojan. It contains embedded JavaScript and multiple external URIs, some of which point to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting, suggesting a link farm for distributing malicious content. The heuristic 'SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE' indicates the document likely instructs the user to decrypt a password-protected archive, a common tactic to evade initial security checks.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9977

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.alfapilates.pl/upload/file/dorada.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://www.potterycommercials.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16131708e6b6e7---93700301392.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sdv.sk/userfiles/articles/file/13656679522.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hpx.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5da902e19742adf550696a56a04e684f/51433298388.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://iktoktatas.hu/files/file/19088470840.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://euroteam.vn/ckfinder/userfiles/files/38156005687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lanna-flyingclub.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/20443780181.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cremyco.com/app/webroot/docs/file/liwamogevikutepivorir.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://deauville.ru/files/file/besum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://vienhung.com/webroot/img/files/fexutarelaxavex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://anticacarsulaeborzoi.eu/userfiles/files/siwebumogigagejovel.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.jacenter.org/js/ckfinder/userfiles/files/bimif.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://shreenathtechnologies.com/userfiles/file/40636164120.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://opsclown.it/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fizujuramibazeladuzo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://qdcmd.com/data/files/buxotifom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gaudi.tw/upload/files/31457534613.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://internationalmedia.com/userfiles/file/sareliwatasos.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://elma1.ru/!upload/files/80604853330.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://hightechrustremovers.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161327b9e55daa---55288542291.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://emusicmarket.com/upfile/board/files/xagawajadumigirabo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cheniou.handysociality.com/upload/files/biwirisafuko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://designclarf.it/file/68505203072.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ud2-140.com/files/27352171956.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gaudi.tw/upload/fileIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/BkSY9tpko7c/uplcv?utm_term=expedite+iptv+apk+downloadPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e0d2.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE0D2 10448 bytes
SHA-256: b63f6a6727c650ef3272803dfffeb83d1c2b639a63c455274cc8799b4d045a74
font_01_sfnt_off0000f8b1.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF8B1 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off000110c3.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x110C3 18700 bytes
SHA-256: d462e6b3f8732245aefa738e3610403c4674ba277028b294c845381078691c50

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