Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 49b9c15adfd52643…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.42 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-07-24
MD5: cffc61990d88e56b5e48721a6f187714 SHA-1: c395bce7b95d0d9236be554221cc4b00a29a9876 SHA-256: 49b9c15adfd52643c9e980a92af5ea642e3d21efaa0022632cbafca87daeb0b0
264 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor object known to exploit CVE-2017-11882. This object is used to deliver a secondary PDF payload which, in turn, contains a direct link to a suspicious URL. The PDF also exhibits evasion techniques and structural anomalies, suggesting a deliberate attempt to conceal malicious activity.

Heuristics 7

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
ole10native_00.bin
5cd376b4ac7224640793fcc3c49ae0a39b2d0ca1a6bd51bb0237f0bb54202b5a		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD000E0150/oLE10NatIve 1517 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000817d.bin
68d167e68895a344f3603a4efd0d8438eb8fdebe759cee48f2b4adf75c76c961		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x817D 12100 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off00009f95.bin
50551000b9f90b3f445ee94749557d9ddf96697a74984b3ccf3d2bae66910750		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9F95 15820 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
4efde74dd6eec70ffae2d033058c495ab073b08e0f22d4be6e6ddea97553242d		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1486334 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006200.pdf
fa2572116fcf67e1e68b0ac0ba871d6c56d62c160109d126f00db4f3d4c8023a		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6200 1465342 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off0000e600.pdf
d6a81db0ad2e3a68cdc1c18fd090ae5c65b31c00da92c4a4348e3563d7b347bd		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0xE600 1431550 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00023e00.pdf
19f0da74c5bbf2076c6dea7a8c66cf0bc7ad6a20a9bccab8908611fbf79e04e3		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x23E00 1343486 bytes

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