Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 49a9e02acdf5bf0d…

MALICIOUS

PDF

44.7 KB
MD5: 33adae000316a31c843d66d969c1ca62 SHA-1: 1d5c07f3f6e107a4c3b9e84112fa83a95228fb15 SHA-256: 49a9e02acdf5bf0d55dac4167374df0e7ccc22c9016456392c44acd542dd7c47
104 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File Execution: Malicious File T1059.001 Command and Scripting Interpreter: PowerShell

The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript and utilizes the ASCIIHexDecode filter, indicating malicious intent. A critical heuristic firing confirms the use of the CVE-2010-2883 exploit targeting Adobe Reader's CoolType SING font table. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for downloading and executing a secondary payload, although the exact script functionality is obscured. The presence of XFA form elements and references to XFA schemas suggests a complex document structure potentially used to mask the exploit.

Heuristics 6

  • Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883
    PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
  • ASCIIHexDecode filter (with exploit indicators) medium PDF_FILTER_HEX
    Hex-encoding filter present alongside exploit delivery indicators — often used to hide payload or shellcode bytes
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ns.adobe.com/xdp/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xci/2.6/
    • http://www.xfa.org/schema/xfa-template/2.6/

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0012_000.js
166950c664eacf5b062514b15f332f5b8e242eb09d5be1ac6e1e3d2b050015da		 pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 12 at offset 0xA0BA 3670 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off0000033c.bin
683fcffe9abaad29001e134bdd9ad7d1628d5cbbf628c451b6c621f202a7dae4		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x33C 65932 bytes

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