Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 49a7099187e8a12d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

686.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel
MD5: 0d1bc4b8fef3542c56670afa3efd27c1 SHA-1: 9702921bb6671229fc3dcc7e0d9d0b2dd787a457 SHA-256: 49a7099187e8a12d28b1cc0e9c5e106d54b025a1eee2ca2fe0b13741a9637d17
128 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.001 PowerShell T1059.005 Visual Basic

The critical heuristic 'CVE_2017_0199: OLE2Link / URL Moniker' indicates the exploitation of CVE-2017-0199, which is used to download remote content. The embedded URL 'https://eohelp.link/I6sHkn?&�' is the likely source of the secondary payload. The presence of a polyglot PDF child further suggests a multi-stage attack designed to evade detection.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://eohelp.link/I6sHkn?&�
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
stream_004_off00034607.bin
690fd924a99759fbf640e4e5175330f59fb46f89e96af6752c4ff80ca62dd147		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x34607 18300 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001400.pdf
00daa1f2094fdf0592362669870527d1e831832573cdf293b1363f5ad6038485		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1400 697344 bytes

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