Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4993188a41ce76c7…

MALICIOUS

RTF

80.6 KB First seen: 2024-09-22
MD5: 05a89145fa97e81da22c0102237b689f SHA-1: 968b7a5b8329ce6853a5dffe60b2529379786fda SHA-256: 4993188a41ce76c7f3f3add9bc51d21e59291fdb14643264a1d205ff2b4373c5
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object that leverages the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882). The presence of RTF_OBJDATA, RTF_OBJAUTLINK, and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics strongly indicates exploitation for client execution. The likely goal is to download and execute a secondary payload, although no specific script or URL was extracted to confirm this.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off0000171a.bin
44107f38dab1e75b56cc768c9fd56ea95d849823713d94698d9ff202e3f5ecad
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x171A 1644 bytes