Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 497a977375495ac5…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

1.77 MB
MD5: 76a265a20e8788bb3798312d8ebb3638 SHA-1: bba9e2bac838fb289fcbb754b5546efa5f83b2c4 SHA-256: 497a977375495ac590ee1ca2d037bb06e25ace568747f8b9b5e1593a8d447865
180 Risk Score

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
c235a98036e5ffe7eb8d44ac07671eef6d95bb82b86f94d9df425f119c8a8184		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 54027 bytes
objdata_01_off0002fe49.bin
a3c4dea994dc8ee11a4f63de30f7dfa57dd55c2b1c12c19d818507bc177d14a2		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2FE49 452820 bytes

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