Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4969f69c96a5cbad…

MALICIOUS

RTF

1.64 MB
MD5: b1b82275823da71f28d5e779008dec69 SHA-1: c75fab670b1d710f40de1fe6fb62539c1430f632 SHA-256: 4969f69c96a5cbadd091548c50485899b1f5173c148445fa78cc182a224120f6
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as related to Equation Editor and triggering CVE-2017-11882. This exploit is known to allow for arbitrary code execution when the document is opened. The presence of ".objupdate" further indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation, confirming the exploit's likely execution path. No specific malware family could be identified from the available evidence.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
bcb3ad51236283ed96a2879b85d0a982dbcb509aa145797a8e0ec6fc669947df
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 55981 bytes
objdata_01_off00033403.bin
51e3b51c22fec6058fbfed48b329fae32a2389a38073e09cf4ca7be95dfe09f2
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x33403 312759 bytes