Malicious Office (OOXML) / .DOCM — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 495d083037ebfede…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML) / .DOCM

68.7 KB Created: 2021-12-16 09:55:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 14.0000
MD5: cf6faf7d7065f2f9ac9b946e563b2891 SHA-1: 848e396750d032cf7d8eb06c4892bf52f53a34a1 SHA-256: 495d083037ebfede3a2516b71fd3f0c63436e9f7db85ad688238df3ab02e8d59
122 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This DOCM file contains VBA macros that use CreateObject to instantiate a WScript.Shell object. The script then attempts to write to the registry key HKEY_CURRENT_USER\Control Panel\Appearance\Schemes\@themeui.dll,-900 with content from a shape in the document. It also executes a command using powershell.exe with the window style hidden, passing a command that appears to be the start of a payload download or execution. The document body contains a lure to 'Enable Content' to view the employment application, which is a common social engineering tactic.

Heuristics 5

  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • VBA project inside OOXML medium OOXML_VBA
    Document contains vbaProject.bin — VBA macros present
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvas
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationships
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/math
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawing
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/main
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroup
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInk
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordml
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShape

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
5e302232e62081ebe31371d04efa3d9b22070081333d3a89185c3785e0fba2f7		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 1146 bytes
vbaProject_00.bin
b9cae3f63971468fa3825c6161cefe19afa091c38b9a7659ba748e306ebe6b2d		 vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 15872 bytes

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