Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4956dbf6f0f7df78…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

2.18 MB
MD5: a2eafd9c6826bc9c259b028b56074cfe SHA-1: 876f0c6faca3d13ffedeb3d2275446eea1010e47 SHA-256: 4956dbf6f0f7df7843bc84ea35790ed9ffd48dd566e19c4d60bcb2c59dcac1ae
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample is an RTF document containing embedded OLE objects, specifically triggering heuristics related to Equation Editor and CVE-2017-11882. The presence of ".objupdate" indicates that the embedded OLE object is forced to activate, leading to the exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability for code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000011e1.bin
a0ecf08fef2e453fe65b09ff7aa383fdcb92b29cd196f27a8d1689b32124ffe3
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x11E1 43119 bytes
objdata_01_off000260ff.bin
1dff60c32303d58fd426d1215689e547377c88210d425e277a4a202bc2e03050
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x260FF 543771 bytes