Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 491da7f96592903c…

MALICIOUS

PDF

69.4 KB Created: 2021-01-27 08:29:41 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-06-05
MD5: 0d2eab06aac25d4d0718361739b819a1 SHA-1: ce92fa66b363b5d94f2f35073fe5bca635024a47 SHA-256: 491da7f96592903c4f94fad173d8bf3e556c9649fda6260fd669d4d3722e0b63
186 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains a large number of external links, many hosted on disposable domains, indicating a link farm or phishing operation. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely for distributing further malware or leading users to phishing sites. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, contains metadata related to 'wkhtmltopdf' and a title that could be a lure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://baarspo.ru/123?utm_term=kritika+the+white+knights+monk+guide PDF link annotation
    • http://mafaregasinuviv.22web.org/85646177145.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/sesijisova/Ue3jgig/float_tube_video_player.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/vetukalujir/hhevcjb/27913852001.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://pusigigapuguv.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131438477/vipaxewekenor-sorazaf-rumerom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gopogaxewose.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/0/134013169/7b0542.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://xafituku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/8/134863640/6053423.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gimitowogavu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134746983/bemod.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xavipinav/gdyquhb/castle_of_illusion_xbox_one_x.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://dugigoje.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/7/134754128/96e77bd73a822ac.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xixewebirike/hjgchgH/micro_battle_server_ip_premiumsuz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://revifobatuge.rf.gd/tevakufip.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wuparol.epizy.com/android_emulator_run_app_from_command_line.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gigitepusiligo.epizy.com/88993929980.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://tawosowi.epizy.com/bavanijetofejupakafuziji.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d2e0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD2E0 5332 bytes
SHA-256: e0a4f0a95388cc7b91f87d3e8986d680b081e95a932a3d98c67b37f927e59465
font_01_sfnt_off0000e4ec.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE4EC 10492 bytes
SHA-256: 33258263f78832d31c8618bc1ce099b994c522317070546dc6290d2b521ec701

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