Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 491b96b8fa52b39a…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

184.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-01-23
MD5: 4edaaf2fd10bdecbeb164062cae5f3b0 SHA-1: d9fa25e6f9be6871bfbfcd4f95ef50b47c8f4236 SHA-256: 491b96b8fa52b39adc951d7b38397436fa107a815f6c79c607ed3e7e9dc142a5
110 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.005 PowerShell

The sample is an Excel file containing an embedded Equation Editor OLE object. Static analysis identified a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-11882, indicating exploitation of this known vulnerability. The VBA macros are present but contain no executable statements, suggesting the exploit payload is directly within the OLE object. The primary attack vector is the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 for client-side execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
0db6366050e88bce7b9121525a84a91bb1806ef221351a0f124333152ab09dc4
ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD02948C5D/OLE10NAtIVe 1530 bytes