Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4913c6f44f9535dd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

85.4 KB Created: 2021-07-05 03:35:55 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-08-20
MD5: fed0667a88b5978dcd0cc9b080c3aa69 SHA-1: 7a9d0ec386addfc16e68d7a4aea5a040ab0e9b42 SHA-256: 4913c6f44f9535dd6832d832a633b548651b9b09dd4c31662e1ff43c3fdce8e9
256 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains an embedded JavaScript payload and multiple URLs pointing to compromised CMS uploads, suggesting it's designed to deliver a second-stage payload. The heuristic 'SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE' indicates the document actively tries to trick the user into executing commands, likely to download and run the payload from one of the provided URLs. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly support its malicious nature.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9964

Heuristics 9

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • Clipboard command execution lure high SE_CLIPBOARD_COMMAND_LURE
    Document tells the user to copy or paste clipboard content into Run, PowerShell, cmd, or another shell-like execution context
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://krisoc.ru/uplcv?utm_term=desired+state+configuration+management PDF link annotation
    • http://mesotects.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a4b7ecbd3a2---sisajalezeronatawex.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://reanda.com/jingkelun/userfiles/files/20210614032733.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bellezaeimagen.com.mx/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1609b3f8a50cad---90964380307.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://eduinfinite.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/70c1130b27e50afb44bf008c877d424c/zebukofa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://gardatrans.com/content/Files/kalasosowofob.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fluellensoflandreth.com/clients/b/bf/bfbe38bd58d8cb8bd08b82175287e3b3/File/37139444280.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://saikunghouse.hk/userfiles/24514658094.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://saftanton.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608c8ac7264de---45437427559.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://fxmeat.com/upload/file/9b501eff433585cc4d556ef8c0db85bb.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://aprilboya.com/userfiles/file/53602875885.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.schroedersales.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d1b14c78ad5a12d7d63ae9f242a91d3b/remidibijubaxu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://interesttour.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/f2e459fe75a79788b14fc93888607f08/pigopazetiwuvelolakisew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://assistance.uz/images/shared/file/dadamurufuxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sg-design.top/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e2e29052da119cb27f60aa74ba5e1c32/43741942296.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://dnepropress.net/files/file/panazulozipafipixoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.euroservicemilano.it/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081dc88048b8---dedizibadexebodawomuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.stallionreadymix.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a103007cc79---66435286028.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://cnokorea.com/userfiles/file/sosedenaxodonisoj.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://karimeh.com/public/userfiles/file/vixivevirepivesisamoxalom.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://beribuket.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d0763b5352855b425ab7271a60cf0de7/77628052104.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://ewms.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/05lqg0chc162jupnlkefnf0mpf/darefovasimibejenadise.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.energetisch-therapeut-estie.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d4d3b87d0b3---vagetetevinedijutovuf.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_000150c3.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x150C3 1635 bytes
SHA-256: 9f4c440e7c3644982955183692f546fd0896e8136948033c9dce3c8989832d50
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='LibreOffice Draw'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Vorufulo Fafayafe</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Desired state configuration management.   Desired State Configuration (DSC) is a configuration technology, written in PowerShell, which prov</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Desired state configuration management.   Desired State Configuration (DSC) is a configuration technology, written in PowerShell, which prov</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Desired state configuration management</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-04-08T02:33:19'
  xmp:CreatorTool='LibreOffice Draw'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='21cd9c8d-b594-4ec5-95ee-5bd81ea04944'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='7ae36b16-30e7-435b-a9dd-1f5b9804c0d4'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e855.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE855 17800 bytes
SHA-256: c413be1f0b8dda7f72cbc363fac4a73f1fcaa1b1d1ec96146cab0ae316b74ddb
font_01_sfnt_off0001175e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1175E 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00012f75.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12F75 10872 bytes
SHA-256: d5ed0c8452b41ad4c1a8ac216980f1880ff1463507189319e3fc6f7fc511c4ff

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