Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4906a2e201b35e5e…

MALICIOUS

RTF

46.4 KB
MD5: 190e27d646e9c33a394640d264bc4e0e SHA-1: ff6027ba50fdd8b95247c3e80677373ff565a1b6 SHA-256: 4906a2e201b35e5ee8763de4aae9c6fa1cde63a76172dedca7b55f1581a53d35
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects and specifically triggers the RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR heuristic, indicating exploitation of the Equation Editor component. The RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristic further suggests that the embedded object is activated, leading to code execution. While no specific script or URL was directly extracted, the nature of the exploit strongly suggests the execution of a secondary payload, likely a downloader.

Heuristics 3

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00001bf2.bin
bf0c75fbf0fd233a91ff436e67787fbfb204fe361811a4d21842938e878b7e4b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x1BF2 2122 bytes