Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48ff7fb54d298968…

MALICIOUS

PDF

3.3 KB Created: 2005-09-29 09:27:34 UTC Authoring application: Adobe PDF Library 8.0
MD5: ab812c6ac91f8125a1305e24b4b91b98 SHA-1: 0b4334db3de358ab99393aeed237df05a2bc37e4 SHA-256: 48ff7fb54d2989685ffeb4ac897398da20bf5286765c6b21429119c40d4b31ae
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.001 PowerShell

The sample is a PDF document that exploits CVE-2010-0188, a vulnerability in Adobe Reader's handling of XFA forms. This exploit allows for the execution of arbitrary code. The embedded JavaScript and XFA form structure indicate an attempt to deliver a malicious payload, likely leading to further compromise.

Heuristics 7

  • Adobe Reader LibTIFF XFA image exploit — CVE-2010-0188 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_0188
    PDF contains XFA image data with an inline crafted TIFF payload and shellcode/delivery markers. This is the data-bound variant of the CVE-2010-0188 Adobe Reader LibTIFF/XFA exploit shape.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36078 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Exploit.Agent-36078
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_file_obj0004.bin
957ab64a88ab1cb3c3b88001adf92905058a32399783f215d9ae04cdcc3023dd
pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 4 at offset 0x1C6 35879 bytes