Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48dffcb3d5e2728b…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.27 MB
MD5: eb99ad83f9d6596121ee63aea808baf7 SHA-1: c51f9cd85e5398dcfbbf0ccf02ddffe60da7bb6d SHA-256: 48dffcb3d5e2728bf122e64e806c3b08abb6ca96bf2f96b9f09597eb1a937485
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, specifically identified as an Equation Editor exploit carrier. This strongly suggests it's designed to deliver a payload via a known vulnerability, likely targeting users through a spearphishing attachment. No specific family could be identified from the available heuristics.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.