Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48df3f72c7574a86…

MALICIOUS

PDF

53.9 KB Created: 2020-10-27 08:05:43 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2026-07-12
MD5: 8b13a767c0ee6d8abd27e1fdac1a8d50 SHA-1: c58f43dffe46abfea9ebef8419e4bf1323af3e1e SHA-256: 48df3f72c7574a86e63a6bf5725203abe40ed5d23d350bf8c572644a6df5fa0d
214 Risk Score

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9999

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • PDF carries website-builder CDN document link farm medium PDF_CDN_PDF_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains many clickable PDF links parked on website-builder CDNs or simple download gateways together with visible ebook, manual, or download lure text. This matches generated SEO document carriers used to route users through untrusted link/download chains; the PDF itself is an inert link carrier.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://ggtraff.ru/wb?keyword=code%20of%20conduct%20lok%20sabha%20election%202019%20pdf In PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4374953/normal_5f97556340c85.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4370264/normal_5f8d063249970.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4383698/normal_5f9624d0316d3.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368224/normal_5f88d2cf0168e.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4379601/normal_5f8befe0b60ed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rajaxamakato.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132302926/43ec7e21c5.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gijepeparo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318767/7331319.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://merebidoso.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134344951/5854076.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mosovokiz.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134333023/4317122.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sisaseno.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/7/130776680/lilozu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4368975/normal_5f89a614df63a.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4366362/normal_5f8cc9ce7752d.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4408462/normal_5f95bf1dd670b.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4380705/normal_5f8de4289e63c.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn-cms.f-static.net/uploads/4413573/normal_5f962c0d1afed.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mupibidegupek.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130874042/zegabileniwiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://lipowuripipu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/3/131378852/lalun_rumowibarevefi_gepivimiro_fafomepererodi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mixekolasum.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134388380/6144247.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://talowitutujuf.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133999148/2856383.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/zetare/al_waqiah_latin.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/fajeloninesitel/software_asset_management_interview_questions_and_answers.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/kawotexulozax/42559914914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006c80.bin)
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006c80.bin)
    • http://smc.org.in)MeeraRegularMeera2016SMC7.0.0+20171102HussainIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00007ff6.bin)
    • http://smc.org.inhttp://smc.org.inIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00007ff6.bin)
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0496/4469/9799/files/nasemovomuxolelananitura.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.shopify.com/s/files/1/0484/3841/1422/files/kinetic_wind_sculpture_for_sale.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn extracted file (font_00_sfnt_off00006c80.bin)
    • https://gitlab.com/smc/meera/blob/master/COPYINGIn extracted file (font_01_sfnt_off00007ff6.bin)

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00006c80.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x6C80 5736 bytes
SHA-256: fdb918b6df14e9d25e1a6e2197372e8555727aa255ad955dd04e33d90895c25d
font_01_sfnt_off00007ff6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x7FF6 8256 bytes
SHA-256: 0e7bf433393459287d24f8a85e1c9e1f63af102e4bfa6eb5c0b346c0f55c26ab
font_02_sfnt_off00009c77.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x9C77 1936 bytes
SHA-256: 73983ccd477f0e4c07634362c0f9f13a23cea415a26bff37f7f125d59a681190
font_03_sfnt_off0000a5ba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xA5BA 10288 bytes
SHA-256: 2cd073966042a4090eedad9a8b79940cb5c51b57cca922570cf13c40a777bf21