Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48db6b45b9467bc5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

72.0 KB Created: 2021-09-07 17:30:56 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-16
MD5: 98bf0b0d350d127bb2b1fb34f25f2689 SHA-1: 6d7657ff856d25fce178a0bbc02733b0cb9879b0 SHA-256: 48db6b45b9467bc5c543219e7f6d41f44d3bc97d9533cc14c2948e1ecf209b15
196 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file was detected as malicious by ClamAV and an ML classifier, indicating a high likelihood of malicious intent. It contains numerous links pointing to compromised WordPress upload storage and disposable hosting, suggesting it functions as a link farm to distribute further malicious content. The malformed stream length heuristic also points to exploit activity within the PDF structure.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9947

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Malformed active-content stream length medium PDF_MALFORMED_EXPLOIT_STREAM_LENGTH
    A PDF stream that carries active/exploit-looking content has a declared /Length that does not match the recovered stream body. Malformed stream boundaries and length mismatches are common parser-evasion/supporting evidence around Reader exploit streams.
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://queure.ru/uplcv?utm_term=facebook+flowchart+pdf PDF link annotation
    • http://104.156.58.56/~web2inbox/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16075d38f228a8---89914619153.pdfPDF link annotation
    • http://redigonda.it/userfiles/files/koxepusewubefuwuxivup.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://3handseg.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160774cd9b1a40---velazizekasaluri.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.a2zmedical.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d5b73e4605---82509063538.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://csc0532.com/userfiles/file/20210824083253_o8ia6g.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sir.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607132317bea1---60222196127.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bagodilovaspark.hu/userfiles/file/33011201252.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://keletunderground.hu/images/uploaded_pics/file/gefuxesovis.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sequoia60.com/clients/875776/File/30571435345.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://a-range.ru/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16073e99c42fa7---889809666.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://pck.malopolska.pl/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9b8606fef071c999d89de4cbcfae1bbc/82252010158.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jordan.si/dokumenti/file/94109344842.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.1000ena.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160d7ebd5788ac---74218833952.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://rencontres-icare.org/userfiles/file/retolodane.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://gamletaarnhuset.no/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160bb540ce799d---rivuwatum.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://chp-travel.ir/data/file/62657962423.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yanarfabrics.com/firma/files/92557599656.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aclamerica.com/customers/CMS-IMAGES/file/pirofolatawatakufugeg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hauptsache.cc/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ac79338a2ea---30471364738.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.grundys.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160979d545859b---remixofila.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://bukharaatlanta.com/sites/default/files/file/3873155386.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://focostrade.com/files/20210614064645.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nmways.com/uploads/fckupload/file/82275160128.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://indyskischool.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/69943565590.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ackerviewguesthouse.com/userfiles/file/gamulivi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000b90b.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xB90B 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0000d122.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD122 10648 bytes
SHA-256: 610e7fa74e7b0803fa8c8e918e5c442d6966f398c6c861f6ae1eb7f9a5c93d66
font_02_sfnt_off0000e97e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE97E 15912 bytes
SHA-256: 79396823846782ddea0ae840d731adfea2d07f267ce7db3b4a2cf1a6d9f748ec