Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48d41d95993be8cc…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

404.0 KB
MD5: e1c5849cdf138b1126abe2ac1c619502 SHA-1: acd4be1e48081fc9b546d36bf6a2bf6aa6c03a76 SHA-256: 48d41d95993be8cc1424376ac0775ea081918417db3c625ce962d0c9eefa1ef0
120 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File

The critical heuristic firing for CVE-2017-0199 indicates that the sample is an exploit carrier designed to download and execute a remote payload from the URL http://hoo.gl/bugH. The OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE heuristic further confirms its role as an exploit delivery mechanism. The default password encryption is a common tactic to evade static analysis.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
    URL http://hoo.gl/bugH
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.