Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48ba7bac4da8ecde…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

15.2 KB
MD5: 08ebf5a230639da9578eeaf3769ff46d SHA-1: 6ea53606fd4d24cc5c168570b71f26238f6d8db5 SHA-256: 48ba7bac4da8ecde8d8b7d26674ed0dd4deebe5cea305a135d8446569d0bcfe8
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.002 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, indicated by the RTF_OBJDATA heuristic. The RTF_OBJAUTLINK and RTF_OBJUPDATE heuristics suggest that these objects are automatically linked and their activation is forced, which is a common technique for delivering malicious payloads. No document body or script content was available for further analysis, limiting the ability to determine the specific payload or family.

Heuristics 3

  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000b46.bin
42c565cb2baa7cadd4a4cc4322e6037d09d64d65a0ef0dd0a830675ad37f4a48
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xB46 2039 bytes