Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48b677e101e54ab6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

9.1 KB
MD5: c98ccee0112722e3e4c45890857d6d1a SHA-1: b22e55c3ad1879dfca4545f841144fd62f3dcc9e SHA-256: 48b677e101e54ab62b806e7bcd2b6a4547f70addd8b7baedcbe1083c41d1a4bc
161 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The RTF file contains embedded OLE object data, specifically triggering the Equation Editor CLSID. The presence of \objupdate indicates that the embedded object is designed to be automatically activated upon opening, leading to exploitation. This pattern is commonly associated with delivering a malicious payload via a known Equation Editor vulnerability.

Heuristics 4

  • Equation Editor CLSID critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Equation Editor OLE CLSID found inside an OLE object — exploited by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 / CVE-2018-0798
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000040.bin
4eae751dbe323a47d4e77a048b140606e3a5d31b2afd2d6ab0a870d863a8a96e
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x40 4643 bytes