Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48afc744d236eec7…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.8 KB First seen: 2022-11-19
MD5: 55d8b70fa9232b797fc42f88fb474ca0 SHA-1: 781b09232ca3611f728b816e12afd52ba4523f73 SHA-256: 48afc744d236eec74dbc8b1cc93500b3d2b4fd2258f95ea85c4ba3627dc0fec0
140 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious Link: Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter

The sample is an RTF document that contains an embedded OLE object, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The 'SE_ENABLE_LURE' heuristic indicates that the document prompts the user to enable editing, a common social engineering tactic. Upon enabling, the embedded object is likely activated via '\objupdate', triggering the Equation Editor exploit to execute a payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00004203.bin
86efec69e609d7f02973b2ed85f854b4385b4837eed96356c67b49209476a6c6
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x4203 1895 bytes