Malware Insights
The critical heuristic firing indicates exploitation of CVE-2017-0199 via an OLE2Link object, which attempts to download a remote payload from the provided URL. The embedded URL is reconstructed as http://%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ZZZZ99999999ZZZZZZ99999999ZZZZZZZ55555Z5Z5Z55Z5Z5Z5ZZZZZZZ0LLLLLLLOOOOO0000000000LLLLL00000000000OOOLLLLLLL@172.245.123.109/x..........x..doc. Although no VBA code was found to be executable, the presence of an embedded PDF with suspicious findings suggests a multi-stage attack. The overall goal appears to be the delivery of a secondary malicious document or executable.
Heuristics 4
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OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
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Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings high POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGEA valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
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VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROSDocument contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23%23ZZZZ99999999ZZZZZZ99999999ZZZZZZZ55555Z5Z5Z55Z5Z5Z5ZZZZZZZ0LLLLLLLOOOOO0000000000LLLLL00000000000OOOLLLLLLL@172.245.123.109/x..........x..doc
Extracted artifacts 3
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
macros.bas7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673 |
vba-macro | oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) | 1206 bytes |
stream_001_off00000960.bin2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x960 | 252488 bytes |
polyglot_child_pdf_off00011800.pdf2386e8dc21a70ab53bad56a41f5578e318158a4df6cf83d4b1c69aac837337a4 |
polyglot-child-pdf | Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x11800 | 360960 bytes |
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