Malicious RTF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 489ad910e560d293…

MALICIOUS

RTF

375.3 KB
MD5: 711cf5fd205c21ef77a2e0d771219b08 SHA-1: 0b8f48483ba926cfa6e56e30095bfb8cd8fac57f SHA-256: 489ad910e560d293e7fc8d9cebf1c567e094a5225339c9daa3ed6237a6d9fa38
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The RTF file contains multiple OLE object-related heuristics, including automatic linking and updates, indicating it's designed to exploit OLE functionality. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a common lure for macro-enabled malware. This suggests the file's primary purpose is to deliver a secondary payload by bypassing security measures.

Heuristics 6

  • Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED
    RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000965.bin
c6dfd61fb40aa517c38527e8f7a0f70f0c882109ac7bdf73549f42a88dc5a4d7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x965 79784 bytes
objdata_01_off00007114.bin
57a241e849db3c3c2f9f4706cb53c8abbd6ac960a941e5a71bd94d915158701b
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114 79757 bytes
objdata_02_off0002f9bb.bin
a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9BB 2632 bytes
objdata_03_off00030f5e.bin
e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F5E 12297 bytes