MALICIOUS
262
Risk Score
Malware Insights
MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell
T1204.001 Malicious Link
T1204.002 Malicious File
The PDF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2010-2883, which is an Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit. The presence of embedded JavaScript and an OpenAction trigger further suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, although its exact functionality is obfuscated.
Heuristics 12
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Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
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Embedded PDF child has suspicious static findings critical PDF_EMBEDDED_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGEPDF contains an embedded PDF stream whose extracted child matches suspicious or malicious PDF heuristics. Wrapper PDFs are commonly used to hide the actual exploit or lure payload from scanners that do not recursively inspect attachments.
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OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTIONPDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
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unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPEunescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
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Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOADPDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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XFA form low PDF_XFAPDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
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AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTONPDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
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Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDEDPDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
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Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGEOne or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
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Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URLOne or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ManifestItem#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xmp/InDesign/private
- http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
- http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/t/pg/
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/Dimensions#
- http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/
Extracted artifacts 11
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0001_000.js5f24b407278784836b97304a6fe1d7431c61640aebc5fd20679de1789724a8f1 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xA | 5050 bytes |
|
Detection
ClamAV:
No threats found
Obfuscation or payload:
likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
|
|||
stream_002_off0000b6ce.jsd1dfd457a2fdd3cec4091f689f39b85b35666aa5599ef3a8d5f9a80d1e2ce105 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xB6CE | 1042 bytes |
font_00_sfnt_off00001916.bin653ca03d0619ec307f08602bab763cada2b1ab61bd4da35c2bad69f6ae8e25f5 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1916 | 65932 bytes |
font_01_type1_off0000bb6f.binc6bf78478c9c4dd5b3b86554d34c78f847f70af4118f9ff083c1fccf0e8e932b |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0xBB6F | 97 bytes |
font_02_type1_off0000bdf7.binb749644b3e758e7335900ab2e7499eaa64b3a946849f1f8a0948287bdd96763d |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0xBDF7 | 144 bytes |
stream_019_off0001a042.js26d7cb03cde8bf3944a5624c9fac13f09284e6934ee9aa1a70432d3067af5ab1 |
decompressed-pdf-stream | PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1A042 | 49155 bytes |
objstm_0121_00.bin9e99b17369476c16e64b08480c525d90adb13e63805d21ffdbf1ec189c6c078f |
pdf-objstm-decoded | PDF /ObjStm 121 0 obj (inflated) | 1250 bytes |
font_00_cff_off0000b46d.bin38d7d0627d6ef08fdb595be75f8f12752f3381fa7a1441ca8f76a5e76dc6e7b9 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xB46D | 609 bytes |
font_01_cff_off0000ba3f.bin5f3f348279f5218a0f3607c4a8e7c1b2190742072e04b58112191aa6b4235f52 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xBA3F | 886 bytes |
font_02_cff_off0000c1e7.bin7e5cb310f6cb7822b8a316192e8347738bb3f1d76fe954bdbf17623d2e87f2fb |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xC1E7 | 3808 bytes |
font_03_cff_off0000d457.bin99bc093cddfa13f76f619bedeaf723ce24882a341f9686e35da3cad8dbab0a72 |
pdf-font-stream | PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xD457 | 3669 bytes |
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