Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 486b17f9892ba285…

MALICIOUS

PDF

147.4 KB Created: 2010-03-31 12:55:11 -04:00 Authoring application: Adobe InDesign CS4 (6.0.4) (via Adobe PDF Library 9.0)
MD5: 23baec5de4b2a3b8845cd676226f44e3 SHA-1: 3c698f42a41fcb9d469f8917c00f26adfc335ceb SHA-256: 486b17f9892ba285d758ba1294f8ae3facaa5c2464255a5fe8204bea54cc0805
262 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.001 PowerShell T1204.001 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File

The PDF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including a critical heuristic firing for CVE-2010-2883, which is an Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit. The presence of embedded JavaScript and an OpenAction trigger further suggests the document is designed to execute arbitrary code upon opening. The embedded JavaScript is likely responsible for downloading and executing a second-stage payload, although its exact functionality is obfuscated.

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader CoolType SING font exploit — CVE-2010-2883 critical CVE likely CVE_2010_2883
    PDF embeds a TrueType/OpenType font with an actual SING table and pairs it with JavaScript heap-spray shellcode. This matches the public Adobe Reader CoolType SING exploit shape for CVE-2010-2883.
  • Embedded PDF child has suspicious static findings critical PDF_EMBEDDED_CHILD_STATIC_TRIAGE
    PDF contains an embedded PDF stream whose extracted child matches suspicious or malicious PDF heuristics. Wrapper PDFs are commonly used to hide the actual exploit or lure payload from scanners that do not recursively inspect attachments.
  • OpenAction trigger high PDF_OPENACTION
    PDF has an /OpenAction — code runs automatically when opened
  • unescape() call high PDF_UNESCAPE
    unescape() found — often used to decode shellcode in PDF JS exploits (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream medium PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an HTML/XFA <script> tag without accompanying Windows shell-execution primitives — common in accessible XFA forms but worth surfacing for analyst review.
  • JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • XFA form low PDF_XFA
    PDF uses XML Forms Architecture — can contain script logic
  • AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTON
    PDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload (matched inside decoded stream)
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/img/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceEvent#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ResourceRef#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/ManifestItem#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xmp/InDesign/private
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/t/pg/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/sType/Dimensions#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/g/

Extracted artifacts 11

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
javascript_obj0001_000.js
5f24b407278784836b97304a6fe1d7431c61640aebc5fd20679de1789724a8f1
pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 1 at offset 0xA 5050 bytes
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 2 eval/decoder/string-building token(s).
stream_002_off0000b6ce.js
d1dfd457a2fdd3cec4091f689f39b85b35666aa5599ef3a8d5f9a80d1e2ce105
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0xB6CE 1042 bytes
font_00_sfnt_off00001916.bin
653ca03d0619ec307f08602bab763cada2b1ab61bd4da35c2bad69f6ae8e25f5
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x1916 65932 bytes
font_01_type1_off0000bb6f.bin
c6bf78478c9c4dd5b3b86554d34c78f847f70af4118f9ff083c1fccf0e8e932b
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0xBB6F 97 bytes
font_02_type1_off0000bdf7.bin
b749644b3e758e7335900ab2e7499eaa64b3a946849f1f8a0948287bdd96763d
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (type1) at offset 0xBDF7 144 bytes
stream_019_off0001a042.js
26d7cb03cde8bf3944a5624c9fac13f09284e6934ee9aa1a70432d3067af5ab1
decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x1A042 49155 bytes
objstm_0121_00.bin
9e99b17369476c16e64b08480c525d90adb13e63805d21ffdbf1ec189c6c078f
pdf-objstm-decoded PDF /ObjStm 121 0 obj (inflated) 1250 bytes
font_00_cff_off0000b46d.bin
38d7d0627d6ef08fdb595be75f8f12752f3381fa7a1441ca8f76a5e76dc6e7b9
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xB46D 609 bytes
font_01_cff_off0000ba3f.bin
5f3f348279f5218a0f3607c4a8e7c1b2190742072e04b58112191aa6b4235f52
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xBA3F 886 bytes
font_02_cff_off0000c1e7.bin
7e5cb310f6cb7822b8a316192e8347738bb3f1d76fe954bdbf17623d2e87f2fb
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xC1E7 3808 bytes
font_03_cff_off0000d457.bin
99bc093cddfa13f76f619bedeaf723ce24882a341f9686e35da3cad8dbab0a72
pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (cff) at offset 0xD457 3669 bytes