Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 486a3ac6f04b33cd…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

3.9 KB
MD5: 30a0c91c4b67d689fe7feddf84c4472d SHA-1: 0c8a76d88fd3eb30b553bafe64d8a5e0963a1710 SHA-256: 486a3ac6f04b33cdb5f66898de8a7196a51aa18c9e9ecc372157e68972757b99
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF file contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. The presence of ".objdata" and ".objupdate" directives strongly suggests an attempt to exploit this known vulnerability. This technique is commonly used to deliver a malicious payload, likely leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000d7.bin
9b5e656f3433cb46e3af6b28683bcdfba376de6e6db5d86be3590f7363dbbd38
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xD7 1726 bytes