Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4867ce54d00343d9…

MALICIOUS

PDF

89.5 KB Created: 2021-07-18 13:29:34 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-09-29
MD5: bf57653f74b60984f48d24fa7bb5adc4 SHA-1: 033a3e95797d65e99f3735b21b4b9b27f05b1454 SHA-256: 4867ce54d00343d9c8ab2a6d1a29a663404fb610d90b7fea1c7ecea9333f26b8
216 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains multiple heuristics indicating malicious intent, including a ML classifier flagging it as malicious and ClamAV detecting it as a phishing trojan. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests it is designed to trick the user into enabling content or treating it as a password-protected archive, a common tactic for malware droppers. The presence of numerous links to compromised CMS upload storage and disposable hosting further supports the likelihood of it serving as a lure for a secondary payload.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Password-protected archive handoff high SE_PASSWORD_ARCHIVE_LURE
    Document gives password instructions for an archive or attachment — often used to keep payloads encrypted until after gateway scanning
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://uhy-th.com/image/upload/files/bixevebizogo.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://connatlas.com/home/conn/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/66285700201.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abril.pe/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/iapnp56imkokcq4jf5cngkd4bs/88494000046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://0-50.ru/userfiles/file/bafigoxojoxebuzelibi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://assistenza-termica.it/file/powajuvape.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://fiberglasssupplydepot.com/userfiles/files/xepibal.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aircond.md/upload_fck/file/42035531989.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.colegiodesafio.net/home/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606f9629311ab---29658705348.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://worthingtonpark101.com/userimages/jejiwuzu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lookupagency.es/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16094233bb88e8---tagodisimezexetudoduvo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://abofahed.com/userfiles/file/nobajuwew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://payassistinc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606cc8c22a3a2---devedigopojapeputon.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://sumangold.net.vn/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/2juta8lvtl0t22nurfhcqdpdur/sajidigetu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.hed-endo.hr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607097b2c7658---lexurigutekekifun.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.a2zmedical.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c298549f71f---lonos.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ohappy.org/userData/board/file/83249138019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.qbuildsoftware.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/9fbdff7e23ad0f7bbe20d19cad9a8bda/rofewe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wenxuezj.com/images/File/josajodej.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cvsc.co/userfiles/file/rijuvogalagi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jdbailbonds.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/fd12bf79eab307e20b2232dcfe85f438/xegawoxojejivoroxo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://xn----8sbpvg0afdbe.xn--p1ai/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/v25ug8spa38vsba4am5agdk821/jetubonavegobipada.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thepetrichortouch.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/76ua9hg66e1q79hpmsjbdeqc9i/samijedajemuzez.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.dj-csnl.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16093c3bf7164b---jexexoborovovimepapoz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/Om9ozkHLxGw/uplcv?utm_term=unlock+excel+file+without+passwordPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000fafc.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFAFC 11104 bytes
SHA-256: 0cb4721f5644900ae5bb3f6ee6fa1dcc6559dc5362f8beccfee0b51926412370
font_01_sfnt_off000114e6.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x114E6 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_02_sfnt_off00012cf8.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12CF8 17204 bytes
SHA-256: 9bfba42e2a37c321fdcdcd62b04a0a6cdd7e5ff7dd1f350c0985a2c126439523

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