Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 482bdfa5f745d0e5…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

519.0 KB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-02-03
MD5: 680f7e27d155aafb7e8424363e5878ce SHA-1: b16357cf1c943ad9a062e23fa18e9a7fa7e3057e SHA-256: 482bdfa5f745d0e52fb5020d3a38ba4d5e0661ac8fda60a632cbccf8d5a2c424
70 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.005 Visual Basic

The sample is an OLE file that exploits CVE-2017-0199 via a URL moniker to download a remote document. The embedded VBA macros are present but do not contain executable statements, suggesting the exploit is directly leveraged by the OLE structure. The primary IOC is the URL used for the remote payload delivery.

Heuristics 3

  • OLE2Link / URL Moniker → remote loader — CVE-2017-0199 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_0199
    Document contains an embedded OLE link object whose URL Moniker points to a remote URL. When the host file is opened, Office follows the link, downloads the URL, and processes the response based on its Content-Type (HTA -> mshta.exe, RTF → Word, etc.) — the documented CVE-2017-0199 primitive. The URL extension is not a reliable filter; servers can return different payloads to Office's user agent.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://dgdfg0000hfjfg0000hfghfg0000hgf00000hfghfgsd000000gfggdfgdfg0000ertdf00000gdfgd00fg@198.46.177.181/7.doc
    • http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673
vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes