Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48296980406d2dcd…

MALICIOUS

PDF

90.5 KB Created: 2021-09-07 01:42:17 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: 5058fed4a63d26fb81517fa143240ba5 SHA-1: e7eaf4d8bebde4e692d5ddbd44965438c51c00e8 SHA-256: 48296980406d2dcdd6dc7d53ee72f156aca89b7c4a3c67e7862da5a03fbfb523
176 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious Link

The PDF contains numerous embedded URLs, many of which point to compromised websites or IP addresses hosting potentially malicious files. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely to lure users to malicious sites or download further malware. The presence of multiple links to compromised CMS uploads and disposable hosting reinforces this phishing and redirection pattern.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9913

Heuristics 7

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • Clickable URI points to raw IP address medium PDF_URI_IP_LITERAL
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) action whose host is a literal IPv4 address. Legitimate documents normally link to named domains; raw-IP destinations are common in disposable phishing and malware-delivery infrastructure.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://next-engineering.com/userfiles/files/74453740581.pdf In PDF document text
    • http://ottotech.center/userfiles/file/delana.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://acetuitioncentre.com.au/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608bf953370a6---45180752641.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://walosports.cl/userfiles/file/xudarawi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.enterpriselighting.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/c17022600055b35f4850280bac8980ca/vifitupuwagevituniser.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alcera.ca/userfiles/file/kadulemakegikaviwofo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.alfainstal.pl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ae2522d2672---kikujiwa.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://alphaveneers.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/31fe58217d08eb55886529a2d039eb90/26448071402.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://elsadaulte.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/84740310812.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://79.170.40.182/boothtastic.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ddf749b1c98---21712862232.pdfPDF link annotation
    • https://fceresources.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/fokijan.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://centralcogtc.com/uploads/file/wiwamirisiwutuduveg.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://aleeblog.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/24499mpidklpvhl86sp5pfee91/74403153512.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.fecomerciomg.org.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/161199514dfd40---rirujuvabisutotuvab.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://angelascanu.it/uploads/file/tulovupekefebafusuwinuvow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://clinicscrm.com/img/files/setazekarexojodap.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://school15-tyumen.ru/f/59012770491.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lalinpress.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/81765115019.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.heainc.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160fe04d49112e---wobov.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://netcsemege.hu/ckfinder/userfiles/files/46353242046.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://postscriptproductions.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160887af378276---87015492152.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://e-instar.com/userfiles/file/31032146330.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lachambredechos.com/userfiles/file/94168112292.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://andlupa.com/userfiles/file/tesepejukapekiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/zMnd8XtcwSM/uplcv?utm_term=scuddles+power+paint+sprayer+manualPDF link annotation
    • https://bxthirteen.wpengine.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/5c2bef8f066cd0180f8e7c29babccbe3/94916856838.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://rt9.rspo.org/ckfinder/userfiles/files/3827117882.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000f5ba.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF5BA 20124 bytes
SHA-256: 41bc619463797f87db78948f29e696f0993b9f0053a29cd46cc1e66ed943c42a
font_01_sfnt_off00012a1c.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x12A1C 11048 bytes
SHA-256: 189ebde0ebf107440fb220dea45125a4caab03ebb9ddd39b2ffaab0d4f58c967
font_02_sfnt_off000143e0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x143E0 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1

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