Malware Insights
The PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, which is used to obscure and likely execute a malicious payload. The 'PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JS' heuristic indicates that the PDF's content is encrypted and protected by JavaScript, preventing static analysis and suggesting an attempt to evade detection. The 'PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LURE' heuristic suggests the PDF may be using images to trick the user into interacting with it, while the presence of JavaScript actions and AcroForm buttons points to an interactive exploit. The JavaScript streams themselves were too small and obfuscated to determine their exact function, but the overall pattern strongly suggests a downloader or exploit delivery mechanism.
Machine Learning
- Nyx PDF Classifier clean score 0.0104
Heuristics 5
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Encrypted PDF carries /JS — payload hidden from static analysis high PDF_ENCRYPTED_WITH_JSPDF declares /Encrypt and also references an executable trigger (/JS). Document encryption hides the JavaScript body and stream contents from static scanners — combined with auto-execution indicators this is a known evasion pattern used to deliver weaponised JavaScript that the analyst cannot inspect without the decryption key.
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JavaScript action low PDF_JAVASCRIPTPDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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Embedded JS stream low PDF_JSPDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
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AcroForm button with action trigger low PDF_ACROFORM_BUTTONPDF contains a /Btn form field together with a SubmitForm/URI/Launch/JS trigger — this is the building block of fake 'Download' or 'Open' button overlays used in PDF phishing lures
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PDF paints image(s) but contains no text operators info PDF_IMAGE_ONLY_LUREPDF has 2 image XObject(s) and the content stream contains no text-emitting operators (BT/ET, Tj, TJ, ', ") in either raw bytes or decompressed streams — this is the screenshot-as-PDF pattern used to bypass text-based scanners and to deliver instructions purely through rendered pixels. It is informational unless paired with invisible links or risky URI context.
Extracted artifacts 4
Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.
| Filename | Kind | Source | Size |
|---|---|---|---|
javascript_obj0318_000.js31143778ba75604ab7316ba85b8c4925377b0f98f6d567569d7851735850e510 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 318 at offset 0x69F8B | 176 bytes |
javascript_obj0314_001.js5c5fe43ed48ff27d488f3414e6b3d08238849d79b4deaef5e53aab32905c954e |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 314 at offset 0x6A155 | 64 bytes |
javascript_obj0312_002.js5a37aa79a733218004c39bccb91fd73fcd1ba43030be1d02886d6f1bc0842d3a |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 312 at offset 0x6A2AB | 64 bytes |
javascript_obj0310_003.js4a50f5c8be2f1761cd8fe36b26909e3bfac6652b8d962ae838abe5f4bfdc7fa2 |
pdf-javascript-stream | PDF /JS object 310 at offset 0x6A401 | 48 bytes |
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