RTF / .DOC malware analysis — malicious · 48065faca406151f

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

375.3 KB

MD5: a095e87f891621c5d03ffc8c2b05210a SHA-1: 2d5bc9430800fcb57463f17016d9d3d0052e8cd6 SHA-256: 48065faca406151f2b792b1e0a5f72d90a3517b4402d7ced9ed84363094c2033

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1204.002 Malicious File T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.005 Visual Basic

The RTF document contains multiple OLE object heuristics, including automatic linking and update triggers, indicating it's designed to exploit OLE vulnerabilities. The document body explicitly instructs the user to 'download the document and click Enable Editing', a common lure for macro-enabled malware. No scripts were extracted, but the OLE object structure and the lure suggest the document is a dropper for a malicious payload.

Heuristics 6

Composite Moniker in RTF OLE object high CVE related RTF_COMPOSITE_MONIKER_RELATED

RTF contains Composite Moniker CLSID in OLE object context, but no nearby scriptlet/SCT payload was confirmed. Treat as related moniker attack-surface evidence rather than proof of CVE-2017-8570 exploitation.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 4 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object
Macro/content-enable lure medium SE_ENABLE_LURE

Document instructs the user to enable macros or editing — a common technique used by malware droppers to bypass Office macro security settings

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00000965.bin` `1fd1251d6c5ad3eb3624ef0d2d9e4c399127e56774ec88d04df4fae872866ad0`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x965	79772 bytes
`objdata_01_off00007114.bin` `1124b9f43a5d29bb6f6b1ba198ec7cdebd1607dbe02175385af425ad7aaf9338`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x7114	79745 bytes
`objdata_02_off0002f9a3.bin` `a8e170497da15decc11753d202c99c86f7a7ffd2d52481e6b9c79a5403675379`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x2F9A3	2632 bytes
`objdata_03_off00030f46.bin` `e8d4fe950caed6dcfde26f4b616825bbe11b93458425974b7d075167f675abf7`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x30F46	12297 bytes

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