Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 48016e5ceccd6859…

MALICIOUS

PDF

86.0 KB Created: 2021-07-04 10:19:26 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-27
MD5: daaab134a39654d8e25ead48c050b70b SHA-1: 68e65337ceef34183094b9d4753fe3f11f4874e0 SHA-256: 48016e5ceccd6859d2604848a671870203efa1be6975f484b2cf0962a7298b57
316 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF document contains embedded JavaScript and multiple URLs, some of which point to compromised CMS uploads. The critical heuristic 'SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE' indicates the document's intent is to trick users into providing recovery secrets or private keys. The embedded script and URLs likely serve to download further malicious content or redirect the user to phishing pages.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9942

Heuristics 10

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Recovery secret / private key request critical SE_SECRET_RECOVERY_LURE
    Document requests recovery phrases, private keys, backup codes, or saved passwords. Requests for these secrets in a document are high-risk.
  • Embedded script payload in PDF stream high PDF_EMBEDDED_SCRIPT_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain script execution markers such as ActiveXObject/CreateObject, WScript.Shell, PowerShell, or shell-exec primitives. This is stronger than ordinary PDF JavaScript because it indicates a staged external script payload hidden in stream bytes.
  • LOLBin token sequence in document text high SE_LOLBIN_RUN_COMMAND
    Extracted document text contains a Windows script/execution tool name (PowerShell, mshta, cmd, rundll32, regsvr32, …) within 220 characters of a dangerous flag, command verb, or URL. This is a visible 'run this' instruction in HTML/PDF/RTF lure bodies, or — in macro-laden Office files — the macro's own string-pool entries appearing adjacent in extracted text.
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://wastran.ru/uplcv?utm_term=ssh+command+in+powershell PDF link annotation
    • http://familiehollander.nl/images/uploadedimages/file/lawuvugavugedupulubuze.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mahae.hu/files/files/dodomatulaziwesi.pdfIn macro / runtime command snippet
    • https://opuntia.eu/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/754bc5847e4c43c6a6f38484ecee5d1d/sinorupoxiwepemabojiten.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://audreyheselmans.com/_files/file/98437854525.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://maidnheaven.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16081915883871---rogodirozoxibe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://parisautotravel.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/6tlt5o0qenatv12490n89ikop1/nigusafepexodaxaz.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://lawyerstitleescrow.com/clients/9/9b/9b7cfcecb5e5abb6b877b2b1d59b4eb1/File/49390775913.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://itacademyindia.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/sulujo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://kraljicabih.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a0268a86017---legolovutexulozowugozev.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://all-new-wow.com/upload/files/ximezibobigodojerose.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.trimbleexpress.sk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160ba35dad3cd9---63497564291.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.brennholz-heinlein.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c8e7f04ff7e---73831752758.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://erinmillssmilesdentistry.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/h7oa675ptrsdsq3t9i9r67r7p4/xoridetipisatori.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://upbfassadenbau.com/upload/file/88083905914.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://artenika.pl/fck/file/68154687262.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://arcdesantmarti.com/biocop/Images/images-editor/file/43633089100.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://simonhoirup.dk/userfiles/file/dunalewatalupe.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.egavilanes.com/ckfinder/userfiles/files/susinimowu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.mearesandassociatesllc.com/siteuploads/editorimg/file/52442707482.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.frankcapassoandsons.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1608f1eb5513b6---36955058006.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.teppiche-waschen-hamburg.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160786f0194824---11873390178.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.sesc.com.ua/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/e12fe80sa2n93hka28stc2agb0/66992041141.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://kidneystonetreatment.in/userfiles/files/85346972823.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sns.hu/_user/file/kixumiwedagefevoxew.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://nek.ua/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16082672e61b58---75356981921.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://familiehollander.nl/images/uploadedimages/In macro / runtime command snippet
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 4

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
embedded_pdf_script_0001529f.bin pdf-embedded-script PDF raw stream script payload at offset 0x1529F 1564 bytes
SHA-256: 96a8fc285f0ff68ec8ff47ce242d3c643e5486f656879ef735495b690037ec87
Detection
ClamAV: No threats found
Obfuscation or payload: likely
Carved artifact contains 3 shell/COM execution token(s).
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
<?xpacket begin='' id='W5M0MpCehiHzreSzNTczkc9d'?>
<x:xmpmeta xmlns:x='adobe:ns:meta/' x:xmptk='QPDF'>
<rdf:RDF xmlns:rdf='http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#'>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:dc='http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/'
  dc:format='application/pdf'>
  <dc:creator>
   <rdf:Seq>
    <rdf:li>Napelu Yoyuza</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Seq>
  </dc:creator>
  <dc:description>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Ssh command in powershell.  I&#39;m currently working on a somewhat restricted environment where we have to run SSH commands on a W</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:description>
  <dc:subject>
   <rdf:Bag>
    <rdf:li>Ssh command in powershell.  I&#39;m currently working on a somewhat restricted environment where we have to run SSH commands on a W</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Bag>
  </dc:subject>
  <dc:title>
   <rdf:Alt>
    <rdf:li xml:lang='x-default'>Ssh command in powershell</rdf:li>
   </rdf:Alt>
  </dc:title>
 </rdf:Description>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:pdf='http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/'
  pdf:Producer='QPDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmp='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/'
  xmp:CreateDate='2020-01-24T16:42:53'
  xmp:CreatorTool='QPDF'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpMM='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/'
  xmpMM:DocumentID='1cf2dbf7-9ee6-41dc-b77f-bbd4c37a2a3c'
  xmpMM:InstanceID='ab996e7c-78ac-4a39-9f6a-0d46685f3f5e'/>

 <rdf:Description rdf:about=''
  xmlns:xmpRights='http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/'
  xmpRights:Marked='True'/>
</rdf:RDF>
</x:xmpmeta>
<?xpacket end='w'?>
font_00_sfnt_off0000e9fa.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE9FA 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off00010211.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x10211 10840 bytes
SHA-256: 83469b8d50ccb1af8ee6feff1716228459b3d5a2742b239f2c61851249956803
font_02_sfnt_off00011ae0.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x11AE0 18052 bytes
SHA-256: 488a27459da60f4cf55733423adb0604d674add3f3b085c928bb05bd66a6c1f3

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.