Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47ff67506937aec7…

MALICIOUS

PDF

230.7 KB Created: 2010-08-12 12:45:42 -04:00 Authoring application: PScript5.dll Version 5.2.2 (via Acrobat Distiller 9.0.0 (Windows)) First seen: 2026-05-10
MD5: 4d616ae5a357ad2afc902c54a3b606c3 SHA-1: 56fa155c35447197d27ae197511a431ec677e0cb SHA-256: 47ff67506937aec71b8c6e9f135481d7523b39ee7cc04d8170fd83d6e2b6e4fb
536 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The PDF file contains JavaScript that triggers a launch action, exploiting CVE-2010-1240 to execute cmd.exe. This command then attempts to export an embedded file named 'cpi.pdf' to common user directories. The embedded file itself was detected as a Windows executable by ClamAV, indicating a payload delivery attempt. The presence of the URL http://www.zeustech.net/ in the JavaScript enrichment suggests a potential command and control or download source.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9993

Heuristics 12

  • Adobe Reader Launch action command execution critical CVE exact CVE_2010_1240
    PDF uses the Adobe Reader/Acrobat Launch action pattern associated with CVE-2010-1240: cmd.exe is invoked with attacker-controlled parameters, paired with an embedded/exported payload.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Tool.Agent-1388586
  • Launch action critical PDF_LAUNCH
    PDF contains a /Launch action whose target is an executable, URL, or UNC path — can start an external application
  • Embedded Windows executable payload in PDF stream critical PDF_EMBEDDED_PE_PAYLOAD
    PDF stream bytes contain an embedded Windows executable with a verified PE header. Exploit chains often hide droppers inside ordinary streams rather than standard /EmbeddedFile attachments.
  • /Launch action target: cmd.exe critical PDF_LAUNCH_COMMAND
    PDF /Launch action specifies an executable target with parameters '/Q /C %HOMEDRIVE%&cd %HOMEPATH%&(if exist "Desktop\\cpi.pdf" (cd "Desktop"' — references a known-dangerous executable (cmd, PowerShell, etc.).
  • Embedded attachment masquerades: declared document, content is windows-executable critical PDF_EMBEDDED_FILESPEC_CONTENT_MISMATCH
    An /EmbeddedFile attachment's declared filename extension or /Subtype MIME type contradicts the magic bytes of its decompressed content. The attachment is declared as a benign document or image but the bytes are an executable or executable-bearing archive. This is a deliberate deception used to hide droppers in PDF attachments and is a generic indicator of embed-and-drop weaponisation, independent of any specific CVE.
  • /Launch action paired with attachment-dropping JS API high PDF_LAUNCH_PLUS_DROPPER_JS
    PDF combines a /Launch action with a JavaScript API call that writes or opens an attached/external resource — the canonical shape of the CVE-2010-1240 /Launch + exportDataObject family. Benign PDFs do not pair these surfaces; the combination indicates a drop-and-execute chain regardless of the specific JS API knobs or /Launch target.
  • Suspicious extracted artifact medium EXTRACTED_FILE_STATIC_TRIAGE
    One or more files extracted from inside this sample matched static suspicious-content checks such as script obfuscation, encoded payload blobs, packed data, or execution/download terms.
  • JavaScript action low 1 related finding PDF_JAVASCRIPT
    PDF contains a /JavaScript action. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Embedded file low PDF_EMBEDDED
    PDF embeds a file attachment — could carry an executable or another weaponised document as a nested payload
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.zeustech.net/ Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://]hostname[:port]/pathIn extracted file (cpi.pdf)
    • http://www.bls.gov/cpi/In PDF document text
    • http://www.bls.gov/cpiIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpivar2009.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bls.gov/cpi/cpisapage.htmIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://www.apache.org/Referenced by PDF JavaScript
    • http://www.iec.chIn extracted file (icc_00_off00002408.icc)
🗂 Part of campaign: ggobi.org 10 samples

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
cpi.pdf pdf-embedded-file PDF EmbeddedFile object 89 at offset 0x2E897 73802 bytes
SHA-256: 3637b0c5af4e471763be0e651cb68cab5eafea8e2d7f6d3598dc9dc9906ea2a5
Detection
ClamAV: Win.Trojan.Swrort-5710536-0
Obfuscation or payload: likely
actual_type=PE; declared_or_context_type=PDF; filename=cpi.pdf; kind=pdf-embedded-file Static shellcode analysis found candidate code region(s). Indicators: SC_PEB_ACCESS, SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS Static shellcode analysis recovered API/import strings: kernel32.dll, advapi32.dll, KERNEL32.DLL, ADVAPI32.DLL, LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress
javascript_obj0090_000.js pdf-javascript-stream PDF /JS object 90 at offset 0x3958B 52 bytes
SHA-256: 0c0d2690339fbaa651b5e8ad0f7e9c2107e75161c0de3adf31fe349e3520e9f1
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
this.exportDataObject({ cName: "cpi", nLaunch: 0 });
icc_00_off00002408.icc pdf-icc-profile PDF ICC profile at offset 0x2408 3144 bytes
SHA-256: 2b3aa1645779a9e634744faf9b01e9102b0c9b88fd6deced7934df86b949af7e