Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47f583e0d78c2311…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

24.9 KB
MD5: 7da8a50c4654901e95a4ea8df8e76843 SHA-1: 85694fed3a73e776a6f362699a6d6f85c0c4018b SHA-256: 47f583e0d78c2311382a901a2f6dfe17cf44f3637aa1ee47a46580eb41e0dede
180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF document contains an embedded OLE object with a specific Equation Editor ProgID, strongly indicating the use of the CVE-2017-11882 vulnerability. The presence of `RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR` and `CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED` heuristics confirms this. The ` tf_objupdate` directive further suggests that the embedded object is designed to be activated automatically, leading to arbitrary code execution.

Heuristics 5

  • Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED
    RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
  • Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB
    RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off00000e94.bin
a7378ca5d920817adeaec5f7a40a2333b563a1269de9920450052f60466ecd56		 rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xE94 1897 bytes

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