Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47e8ba874a261296…

MALICIOUS

PDF

186.9 KB Created: 2021-08-08 04:48:41 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 5.11.3) First seen: 2021-10-07
MD5: c5c8d882327a8ce91febd1d4925948ec SHA-1: 808fdd84884b31f7b8ed3b1632e7db7b91d7f8ee SHA-256: 47e8ba874a26129686dc54fe2d4c2bea20e6362c5f55fbb7a0c1b6ab942dbe96
172 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.007 JavaScript T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

This PDF file contains embedded JavaScript, which is a common technique for executing malicious code. The file also features a link farm pointing to multiple distinct hosts, many of which appear to be compromised WordPress sites used for hosting malicious PDFs. The ClamAV detection and ML classifier strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware delivery.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9963

Heuristics 8

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Embedded JS stream low PDF_JS
    PDF references a /JS stream. Generic JavaScript is common in benign forms; specific dangerous APIs are scored by separate rules.
  • Visual download / call-to-action button lure low SE_DOWNLOAD_BUTTON
    Document contains a call-to-action phrase ('Click here to download', 'Download Now', etc.) — low-signal unless other findings point to a malicious workflow
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://artecgroupservices.com/imagenes/file/14022273961.pdf In PDF document text
    • https://codecs.roimages/file/wamalukujigileno.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.bestlifepolicy.co.uk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c2e78eed17c---vuvezurujogesuzuko.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.davinci.dk/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160a18affa4eb6---99922755687.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://akdenizokullari.k12.tr/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/edtc3h080b64csfih8bmchetv7/16104458756.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://paintingservicesonline.ca/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160887f893d3f7---runuzofemoforinag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://genia-groupe.fr/images/files/51808297938.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mokhalasati.com/userfiles/files/11851233012.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://castel.ro/userfiles/file/85870156540.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://technoauto.jp/js/upload/files/rujujuvixi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://thewentworthco.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/lv8kuk1hid4civr8ld1lr88iqt/niraranusuladuwo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://yuanyoujie.vip/userfiles/file/60376409258.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://mytutr.com/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/299ab2d863faff79a80857e76e567234/firirapapezo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://creativenursery.net/home/creative/public_html/ckfinder/userfiles/files/12598448735.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ausafrica.co.za/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d7f9eb1c59---gawukixejufu.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://breedlife.com/upload/files/pegini.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://newat.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/bde46e3ab71dfaab16f445a8c84fdde7/82418141275.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://hotellemaritime.com/hotel/upload/files/sanirorasuxilafexosow.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.iycadana.org/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/mvcqm514n51k96udu6gg3t40a3/79331787565.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://vipavtoufa.ru/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/613356efa8aa1627d603061bf468c1e4/bufuw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://az4group.com.br/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160828b5cc4f83---17301975437.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.lightingsolutionsinc.net/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/d73249a966b11168dae62e071ee2c92d/52513406610.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://sattamatkapatti.com/userfiles/file/midururowiv.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://www.gml.de/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160908fa956b51---37926493674.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/skout/mBVl/~3/GLLx1DTH0VQ/uplcv?utm_term=how+to+program+a+ti+84+plus+silver+editionPDF link annotation
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.netIn PDF document text
    • http://dejavu.sourceforge.net/wiki/index.php/LicenseIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off00027167.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x27167 16792 bytes
SHA-256: 9d2294e344127da9ddc2b77d68b1576b6b78373885bc9da2859f180a98f2c1e1
font_01_sfnt_off0002897e.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2897E 11264 bytes
SHA-256: 15119ac5cfeb2f830c1d12934b7d2262deb373571e6304534cb01adce0607398
font_02_sfnt_off0002a3ce.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x2A3CE 20916 bytes
SHA-256: b93658cf1ff8aa1ddc5f2acb29a81b4a28cf4d8418d72ee559fe0ad6d93c6610