Malicious RTF / .DOC — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47e6b292de40a2e6…

MALICIOUS

RTF / .DOC

4.0 KB
MD5: d7ab1c486f9246ef5bb40deb3148d3ca SHA-1: 03ed5f9e15cd669d5e389dc589ea24f4ea1eacfb SHA-256: 47e6b292de40a2e632e4b9c08fc53cf6545c34e5995e185c52d724f769915671
160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.002 Malicious File T1059 Command and Scripting Interpreter T1559 Component Object Model Hijacking T1559.001 Component Object Model

The RTF document contains embedded OLE objects, specifically targeting the Equation Editor component. The presence of \objautlink, \objdata, and \objupdate control words strongly indicates the exploitation of CVE-2017-11882 or a similar vulnerability. This mechanism allows for automatic execution of malicious code upon opening the document, likely leading to the download and execution of a second-stage payload.

Heuristics 4

  • Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR
    RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
  • Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK
    RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
  • \objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE
    RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
  • OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA
    RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
objdata_00_off000000f8.bin
e7c39c956e492dd5f9435e9910de00abf38d52af2afaecb5f1ebf81cd604eef8
rtf-objdata-decoded RTF \objdata at offset 0xF8 1721 bytes