Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47b7ecbfbf4ba7c8…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

114.0 KB
MD5: 0a0f9141ebfd9582aa3ef6cd07343e25 SHA-1: cdcc74bf70c00fce36b3147d79a2ded452517ed8 SHA-256: 47b7ecbfbf4ba7c8a887c18d68509d8780abe77e807f93ea58cefe1e8755117a
220 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1105 Ingress Tool Transfer T1059.001 PowerShell

The presence of SC_STR_WINEXEC, SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY, and SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS heuristics indicates the use of Windows API functions commonly employed by malware to execute code and load libraries. The SC_XOR_ENCODED heuristic suggests that malicious strings or code are obfuscated using XOR encoding with a key of 0x03. While no specific malicious URLs were extracted, the overall pattern points to a macro-based downloader that likely uses these API calls to fetch and execute a secondary payload. The OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY suggests a potentially packed or intentionally obfuscated file structure.

Heuristics 6

  • XOR-encoded strings (key 0x03) critical SC_XOR_ENCODED
    Found 8 Windows library/API name(s) XOR-encoded with single-byte key 0x03: 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAlloc', 'VirtualAllocEx', 'VirtualProtect', 'VirtualProtectEx', 'CreateProcessA', 'WriteProcessMemory', 'ReadProcessMemory'
  • Reference to WinExec API high SC_STR_WINEXEC
    Reference to WinExec API
  • Reference to LoadLibrary API high SC_STR_LOADLIBRARY
    Reference to LoadLibrary API
  • Reference to GetProcAddress API high SC_STR_GETPROCADDRESS
    Reference to GetProcAddress API
  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 116,736 bytes but its declared streams total only 56,346 bytes — 60,390 bytes (52%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://www.microsoft.com
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa
    • http://ocsp.verisign.com/ocsp/status0
    • https://www.verisign.com/rpa0
    • http://crl.microsoft.com/pki/crl/products/CodeSignPCA.crl0

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