Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLS — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47b008779288f5b7…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLS

1.25 MB Created: 2006-09-16 00:00:00 Authoring application: Microsoft Excel First seen: 2023-09-06
MD5: 2d4f4f1ec144752d35e7613ea2705267 SHA-1: 63903875aa0e55365c4f0c76d9429a2a366fd4e6 SHA-256: 47b008779288f5b79391f63b8c832d91c7874ce2b0fd699456624b86299a985a
272 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1204 Malicious Link T1204.001 Malicious Link: Malicious Link T1559.001 Component Object Model Hijacking: Component Object Model Hijacking

The sample contains an embedded Equation Editor object known to exploit CVE-2017-11882. This object likely serves to deliver a secondary PDF payload, which in turn contains a direct link to an executable or archive. The PDF also exhibits parser evasion techniques, indicating a sophisticated delivery mechanism.

Heuristics 8

  • Equation Editor Ole10Native payload — CVE-2017-11882 critical CVE likely CVE_2017_11882_EQUATION_OLE10NATIVE
    An embedded Microsoft Equation 3.0 object (CLSID 0002CE02-0000-0000-C000-000000000046) carries an Ole10Native packager stream instead of the normal Equation Native/MTEF data. This is the weaponized Equation Editor RCE delivery shape used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 maldocs. The payload (font-record overflow + shellcode) is frequently encrypted and the stream name case-scrambled to evade scanners, but an Equation object holding an Ole10Native stream has no benign use.
  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Contains Equation Editor object — related to CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploitation, but CLSID presence alone is not the malformed MTEF exploit primitive.
  • Secondary embedded PDF body has suspicious static findings critical POLYGLOT_CHILD_PDF_STATIC_TRIAGE
    A valid PDF body was found at a nonzero offset inside another container and its carved contents matched PDF exploit or lure heuristics. This catches polyglots where the top-level magic routes to ZIP/OLE while a PDF reader or downstream parser opens the hidden PDF payload.
  • PDF link points directly to executable/archive payload critical PDF_DIRECT_PAYLOAD_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable HTTP(S) URI whose path ends in an executable, script, shortcut, disk image, or archive extension. Documents can legitimately link to installers, so this is a high-risk delivery indicator rather than a standalone exploit fingerprint.
  • Clickable PDF combines external action with parser-evasion structure high PDF_ACTION_PARSER_EVASION
    PDF has an external clickable URI together with object graph or xref structures that make parsers disagree, such as divergent duplicate objects, parser divergence, or xref offset mismatch. That combination is stronger than a plain link: the document is both an outward-action carrier and a parser-confusion/evasion sample.
  • VBA project contains no executable statements low OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains a VBA project, but extracted modules only contain attributes/options/comments and no executable statements.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://https://www.google.co.in/example.com
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/

Extracted artifacts 7

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas
7f506327609c082af1cd37dde23bc2c71a000f7d1ef530b6abb66775040a7673		 vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1206 bytes
ole10native_00.bin
e0fbf7915c86917d4aaf9de81827d9a377f04591a9398c9445dd49810a840369		 ole-package OLE Ole10Native stream: MBD0090ECD5/Ole10native 1449 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00060c00.pdf
89b4b0552e0c99d3a782b0618bd1ec9d051c6f780022ad8209c5a02cfd6c5883		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x60C00 911872 bytes
stream_003_off00005f60.bin
2998a126f4fa11ceb265371a5f7968ec18bc4692a32631a544232dc74040021f		 decompressed-pdf-stream PDF FlateDecoded stream at offset 0x5F60 252488 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00001000.pdf
f2b99342b064d0e52beb6ae1786c2c523fddfcff433f4dd7334ab77e121256b7		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x1000 1304064 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00006600.pdf
01e1a990d69f2e59929a18f5192f988d3cb8ea4049aa65fdf8754b40078d9b52		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x6600 1282048 bytes
polyglot_child_pdf_off00029600.pdf
60bb952cf416e300f62309faa5efd256c52e736463817e076d2cd3faee6e76c8		 polyglot-child-pdf Secondary PDF body inside ole container at offset 0x29600 1138688 bytes

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