RTF malware analysis — malicious · 479e318203aceb94

MALICIOUS

RTF

2.24 MB

MD5: 5ba538f50905504a2cd72c688ea1e969 SHA-1: 3c1bcfe8177c3647c8dea1e0090bcae303189caf SHA-256: 479e318203aceb940cea4e73b5bc953a1ad3429b45b8b889c6b729202bc178eb

180 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File T1059.003 Windows Command Shell

The RTF file contains multiple indicators of malicious activity, including embedded OLE objects and specific firings for RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR and CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED. The presence of these heuristics strongly suggests exploitation of the Equation Editor vulnerability (CVE-2017-11882) to achieve code execution. The ".objupdate" directive further indicates an attempt to force OLE object activation. No document body or scripts were extracted, but the exploit indicators are sufficient for a high-confidence assessment.

Heuristics 5

Equation Editor activation — CVE-2017-11882 related high CVE related CVE_2017_11882_ACTIVATION_RELATED

RTF decodes to an Equation.3 ProgID and requests OLE activation with \objemb plus \objupdate. This reaches the legacy Equation Editor attack surface used by CVE-2017-11882/CVE-2018-0802 documents, but the malformed MTEF/native payload needed for stronger attribution was not recovered.
Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 2 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects
Embedded OLE object medium RTF_OBJEMB

RTF contains \objemb — embedded OLE object

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001202.bin` `52b09c1fdb2ff59bcf286d58def4284550377dc0968b5e7327bac3c41b53b880`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1202	27753 bytes
`objdata_01_off0001d2df.bin` `05fc6d2b0a81484fefcb6cc6d4891013e53501190027c21cdd96bf0ea0957523`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D2DF	478713 bytes

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