RTF malware analysis — malicious · 479652c7602da6b1

MALICIOUS

RTF

69.2 KB First seen: 2024-10-06

MD5: 6bae31d354a4548354b0705e447b2a60 SHA-1: 36a3117d6a7d9cabc9d9ad938a53003b066568da SHA-256: 479652c7602da6b16b80e6e2c3d32bfd0a7f9d667fdfe386555532873358769d

160 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK

T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The RTF document contains multiple indicators of exploitation targeting the Equation Editor vulnerability. Specifically, the presence of \objdata, \objupdate, and a split Equation Editor ProgID strongly suggests an attempt to leverage this known exploit. This technique is commonly used to download and execute a second-stage payload, leading to a full system compromise.

Heuristics 4

Split hex Equation Editor ProgID + OLE object critical RTF_EQUATION_EDITOR

RTF embeds the Equation.3 ProgID as hex bytes near OLE object activation and splits the byte stream with whitespace or an ignorable RTF group. This is an Equation Editor OLE activation surface commonly used by CVE-2017-11882 / CVE-2018-0802 exploit documents.
Automatically linked OLE object high RTF_OBJAUTLINK

RTF contains \objautlink — an automatically linked OLE object surface that can be updated or activated when Word opens the document.
\objupdate forces OLE activation high RTF_OBJUPDATE

RTF contains \objupdate — forces automatic OLE object instantiation when the document is opened, bypassing user interaction. Almost exclusively seen in Equation Editor exploit documents.
OLE object data medium RTF_OBJDATA

RTF contains 1 \objdata section(s) — embedded OLE objects

Extracted artifacts 1

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

Filename	Kind	Source	Size
`objdata_00_off00001d78.bin` `8cc01a879a9a1e235401541632bfae46590c566b9900eab63b7a698245b61991`	rtf-objdata-decoded	RTF \objdata at offset 0x1D78	1549 bytes

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