Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 476218ab0a70b232…

MALICIOUS

PDF

73.0 KB Created: 2020-11-11 17:47:34 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: a2d7b27a971297b9339bfa5960c1593c SHA-1: d34e39069c36694d1df02bb6a279aeec396d16b9 SHA-256: 476218ab0a70b232cb93c20f640f767830a0bdd75864ad5e0f519aa1d55ad230
244 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

This PDF file contains a large number of embedded links, many pointing to external PDF files hosted on disposable domains or cloud storage. The heuristic 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' indicates that at least one of these links directs to known malicious redirector infrastructure. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly suggest malicious intent, likely to distribute malware or engage in phishing through these linked resources.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9997

Heuristics 6

  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF contains mass external PDF link farm critical PDF_SEO_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links, mostly clustered on one host. This matches generated SEO/link-farm PDF carriers used to route users into malicious or unwanted-software delivery chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern.
  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://traffmen.ru/aws?utm_term=video+film+bioskop+komedi+indonesia
    • https://moxoviwepikiwu.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/8/132814726/giratezev.pdf
    • https://setivegubuwo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134446573/mikilajizujivi_vijifowoliradim.pdf
    • https://xebikazogede.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/7/132740990/jafofabum.pdf
    • https://wofexexugov.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134318452/balariwifefomasesimu.pdf
    • https://winomumamo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/0/131070375/2522629.pdf
    • https://dosarowit.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/3/134315771/kavoduv-sapumuvaledimut-bosolaxifakelan-kuduvoz.pdf
    • https://xadaxegaku.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134444747/luzifaresu.pdf
    • https://zorimogitew.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/4/4/134487520/semujif-newakujil-jamubema.pdf
    • https://vopevejefed.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/6/131606133/2e7ee641.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bulikowexunepov/44079849754.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/genedesowul/gasuxul.pdf
    • https://s3.amazonaws.com/bikikanafopavu/94398592381.pdf
    • https://uploads.strikinglycdn.com/files/896212d3-da5a-473e-9309-bcf0a9ce87d4/41526323264.pdf
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000d4c1.bin
932bdbc9a8a88fe688485de1a6a162f05a0229ffdea557da1e56c3124e4bb4bd		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xD4C1 4968 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000e586.bin
710c94b09743e62adaa9fc8e555d7de1854ac85acbfa3f11d3a773b09fcb3a6a		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE586 10364 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000108de.bin
a542ec26cea93e049a2e27cd59b1347dd9bbdea13775fd7b822b3c2b3136116f		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x108DE 4324 bytes

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