Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 476211169787b35e…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

1.23 MB
MD5: b7b51e5d25f0e04847a6711a31dbcabf SHA-1: f27fea2b59dc5b585b2d009ec86d46183363b4cf SHA-256: 476211169787b35e2c6ff2dbe1bdc885ff47cdb59b9fc550cdfa7e66bee671a2
100 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1204.002 Malicious File

The OOXML file is encrypted with a default password and contains embedded OLE objects, one of which is identified as an Equation Editor object. This strongly suggests the file is designed as an exploit carrier, likely delivered via spearphishing, to exploit vulnerabilities within the Equation Editor component.

Heuristics 3

  • Equation Editor OLE object high CVE related OLE_EQUATION_EDITOR
    Default-encrypted OOXML embedded OLE object xl/embeddings/oleObject1.bin contains the Equation Editor CLSID, the legacy component exploited by CVE-2017-11882, CVE-2018-0802, and CVE-2018-0798.
  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.