Malicious Office (OLE) / .XLSX — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47528741b742af8d…

MALICIOUS

Office (OLE) / .XLSX

32.5 KB
MD5: d483c2228ea8170a27b253e261a1920b SHA-1: 6e3a965ce74c7a12aa890112c3edc08f9b7b3c8b SHA-256: 47528741b742af8ddf02e69da244ff02e379558f086bd4f8d654655bcfe6f061
60 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1027 Obfuscated Files or Information

The OOXML document is encrypted with a default password, indicating it's likely a carrier for malicious content. The presence of an embedded OLE object further suggests an attempt to conceal and deliver a secondary payload. Without further analysis of the OLE object, the exact attack vector and family remain undetermined.

Heuristics 2

  • Default-encrypted OOXML exploit carrier layout high OOXML_ENCRYPTED_EXPLOIT_CARRIER_SHAPE
    Default-password encrypted OOXML package contains embedded OLE object parts and additional activation/decoy parts. This layout is common in malicious Excel exploit delivery and requires inspecting the decrypted package.
  • Office OOXML encrypted with default VelvetSweatshop password medium OFFICE_DEFAULT_PASSWORD_ENCRYPTED_OOXML
    OLE EncryptedPackage decrypts with Excel's built-in VelvetSweatshop password. Office opens this transparently, and malware uses it to hide OOXML exploit parts from scanners that only inspect the outer OLE container.