Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 4739ea561b5009c5…

MALICIOUS

PDF

77.0 KB Created: 2021-06-21 00:48:32 +03:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7)
MD5: de358ae150d9fd7671e65664fce0fb62 SHA-1: 3f6b5ae57c7b237cc8792ebb3a47baa5cbd1cf70 SHA-256: 4739ea561b5009c5e830dbe883e2e84f9cc85024b70c971b3f221ae66a1c42cf
156 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1203 Exploitation for Client Execution

The PDF contains numerous links to compromised websites, identified as a link farm. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, specifically phishing. The document's structure and embedded URLs suggest it is designed to redirect users to potentially harmful sites, likely for credential harvesting or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 6

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2528dad23a95d95-d2528dad23a95d95-10044376-0
  • PDF link farm points to compromised-WordPress upload storage medium PDF_COMPROMISED_CMS_UPLOAD_LINK_FARM
    PDF contains multiple clickable links, across many distinct hosts, whose targets are random-slug files parked in the upload directories of vulnerable WordPress form plugins (FormCraft, Super Forms). This is the hallmark of the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains hosted on compromised sites. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • External URI info PDF_URI
    PDF contains an external URL action
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://www.frankcapassoandsons.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160be4e54e5863---kagotedivudimepogokarik.pdf
    • http://conwaychristian.org/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c74b3ca9023---vewepelenidid.pdf
    • http://binarbaidrealestate.com/public_html/userfiles/file/13460807780.pdf
    • http://www.medical-psychology.gr/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/16096aecee68c4---gogug.pdf
    • http://evabody.ro/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1606ce4cde5705---31205178987.pdf
    • http://counterreaction.net/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/160c91d4377e6c---14782367674.pdf
    • http://alkanboya.com/files/file/%5C/pumuliturijovedig.pdf
    • https://medtek.vn/storage/file/21161838919.pdf
    • http://www.medicalalliedtraining.com/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1607d7816a4c3e---wuxatigizozomizalovunot.pdf
    • https://almoheetmanpower.com/public_html/userfiles/file/wedibi.pdf
    • http://hani-bee.com/userfiles/files/kaguwalonu.pdf
    • http://toptoptraining.ru/img/upload/file/91793452961.pdf
    • https://robinio.de/wp-content/plugins/super-forms/uploads/php/files/cogqqnci0tl8mial7f1sb1ag0e/jedome.pdf
    • https://cffcommunications.nl/wp-content/plugins/formcraft/file-upload/server/content/files/1/16077805f3c8e7---futibedisugodagu.pdf
    • https://louvre.lv/res/wysiwyg/file/14744128841.pdf
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.html
    • http://www.daltonmaag.com/
    • https://feedproxy.google.com/~r/1eyvgo/aqOO/~3/DOqCt-cVA4I/uplcv?utm_term=parabola+ellipse+hyperbola+formulas
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFL

Extracted artifacts 3

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e02f.bin
a6942ec165f1f3eb02540b6ed68abeeab5c6ac0071ff0ccf1e83c990f31d9000		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE02F 5080 bytes
font_01_sfnt_off0000f16e.bin
f2de540f521c166844b07f4cc56ecac417fc42d8ce27ca9c4fa2afd6e23ed4d7		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xF16E 11592 bytes
font_02_sfnt_off000118e5.bin
9f355172d696dda274cac500966718f112ce76951f19577ac4888987ea6471b2		 pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0x118E5 4324 bytes

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