Malicious PDF — malware analysis report

Static analysis result for SHA-256 47291c44bab2a3d8…

MALICIOUS

PDF

75.0 KB Created: 2021-02-13 10:08:00 +02:00 Authoring application: wkhtmltopdf 0.12.5 (via Qt 4.8.7) First seen: 2021-05-23
MD5: bd0f4cd2b971446b4cf21acd154064e0 SHA-1: b0d1517cfeee772d07aab5444658e0e179b4b6c5 SHA-256: 47291c44bab2a3d8e06c94a74df8200477bcba62e668b1cf1fb758738e768a2b
184 Risk Score

Malware Insights

MITRE ATT&CK
T1566.001 Spearphishing Attachment T1059.007 JavaScript

The PDF contains embedded links that redirect to known malicious infrastructure, as indicated by the 'PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK' heuristic. The document body, though heavily obfuscated, suggests a lure related to 'Us department of education wage garnishment worksheet'. The ML classifier and ClamAV detection strongly indicate malicious intent, likely for phishing or malware distribution.

Machine Learning

  • Nyx PDF Classifier malicious score 0.9998

Heuristics 5

  • ClamAV: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0 critical CLAMAV_DETECTION
    ClamAV detected this file as malware: Pdf.Phishing.Trojan-d2568dad23a94d95-d2568dad23a94d95-10044375-0
  • PDF links to known malicious redirector infrastructure critical PDF_MALICIOUS_REDIRECTOR_LINK
    PDF contains a clickable URI to redirector infrastructure used by a known malicious PDF SEO/adware delivery campaign. These documents typically rely on user interaction and redirect chains rather than a PDF parser vulnerability.
  • Small PDF is a non-clustered link farm on disposable hosting medium PDF_SEO_DISPOSABLE_LINK_FARM
    Small PDF contains many clickable external PDF links spread thin across many distinct hosts (no single dominant host), corroborated by a utm_term SEO-redirector link and/or links parked on free/disposable content hosts. This is the 'free document/template' SEO phishing PDF family, which ranks for search queries and routes users into payload/redirect chains, rather than a normal document citation pattern. The PDF itself carries no exploit — the risk is the linked destinations.
  • Object number defined twice with different bodies info PDF_DUPLICATE_OBJ_BODY_INCREMENTAL
    The same indirect object (N G) is defined more than once with different body bytes. First-wins and last-wins readers will resolve different content, which is a parser-confusion shape used by targeted PDFs. Body-only differences are common in benign incremental updates, so severity is raised only when the duplicate carries active content.
  • Embedded URL info EMBEDDED_URL
    One or more URLs were extracted from the document. The URL itself is not a detection — see the per-URL labels for which channel (macro, JS, link annotation, document body, ...) reached each URL.
    URL https://yafferge.ru/wb?keyword=us%20department%20of%20education%20wage%20garnishment%20worksheet In PDF document text
    • https://pikisavejalanab.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/3/9/133986241/nikumarumom-wodapotokusowi-ribagitof-ragaxotudavojo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/suxujaba/TnpQNhe/82511163268.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/muluxodipoto/cgiUruq/73181687720.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wacc-cat.org/zunizobezetejolekx9ms.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://ruxiroxawem.22web.org/application_letter_for_scholarship.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://zofokesagofot.22web.org/vikudivagajil.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://it50save.info/jikatafigomatugopamudajefzff63.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://tikedamo.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/1/4/131453682/zawikugulolo.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jewafime.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/6/132681773/piribuzafi.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://spencermcman.us/puripiva9baq7.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://cdn.sqhk.co/xodakebebit/bieO6xp/82033982896.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://jipafedi.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/0/8/130813136/c868cfec.pdfIn PDF document text
    • https://wozukofa.weebly.com/uploads/1/3/2/3/132303282/2847050.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/In PDF document text
    • http://www.ascendercorp.com/typedesigners.htmlIn PDF document text
    • http://xoroniwogogo.rf.gd/masevevag.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://wulevizoreb.epizy.com/kuvugozut.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://teveniwavabubak.rf.gd/pafumezurawefizewiw.pdfIn PDF document text
    • http://www.w3.org/1999/02/22-rdf-syntax-ns#In PDF document text
    • http://purl.org/dc/elements/1.1/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/pdf/1.3/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/mm/In PDF document text
    • http://ns.adobe.com/xap/1.0/rights/In PDF document text
    • http://scripts.sil.org/OFLIn PDF document text

Extracted artifacts 2

Files carved from inside the sample during analysis.

FilenameKindSourceSize
font_00_sfnt_off0000e736.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xE736 5684 bytes
SHA-256: 4cd0d91efba6fa19e291e47ae64a93469002533c14808e2ca642cead851ced95
font_01_sfnt_off0000fa7a.bin pdf-font-stream PDF embedded font (sfnt) at offset 0xFA7A 10656 bytes
SHA-256: e973929a186fe66770a28e5d425dc342a9bf53b4bb5ab1e315c1f66ee9b3e072

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